Emergency Action Plan (EAP)

For

Rattlesnake Canyon Dam Orange County, California

4955 Portola Parkway Irvine, CA 92620 Latitude: 33.7282; Longitude: -117.7421



Dam Owner: Irvine Ranch Water District

DSOD South Region
DSOD Dam No. 1029.003

National Inventory of Dams (NID) No. CA00855 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) No. N/A

> Date Prepared: February 5, 2021 Prepared By: Stetson Engineers, Inc. (760)730-0701



Phone numbers and email addresses have been removed from this publicly posted copy of this Emergency Action Plan. That information is available from Irvine Ranch Water District's district secretary: Phone 949-453-5300. Email Comments@IRWD.com.

Dam Contact Information

Rattlesnake Canyon Dam

4955 Portola Parkway Irvine, CA 92620 (33.7282, -117.7421)

24-Hour Emergency Contact: Wendy Chambers, Executive Director of Operations

Dam Owner: Irvine Ranch Water District Contact: Paul Cook, P.E., General Manager

Mailing Address: 3512 Michelson Drive, Irvine, CA 92612-1799

Dam Operator: Ken Pfister, Water Operations Manager, Irvine Ranch Water District

EAP Coordinator: Emilyn Zuniga, IRWD Safety and Security Manager

Phone numbers and email addresses have been removed from this publicly posted copy of this Emergency Action Plan. That information is available from Irvine Ranch Water District's district secretary: Phone 949-453-5300. Email Comments@IRWD.com.

Key Dam Information

Dam Description

 Height:
 73 feet
 DSOD #:
 1029.003

 Year Built:
 1959
 NID #:
 CA00855

Dam Operator: Ken Pfister, IRWD Hazard Classification: Extremely High Dam Owner: IRWD Property Owner: City of Irvine



Potential Impacted Area

Rattlesnake Canyon Dam is located at the west end of Rattlesnake Reservoir on land in Irvine, CA. The area downstream of the dam is mostly flat, urban space, which drains southwest toward the Pacific Ocean. If Rattlesnake Canyon Dam were to fail, parts of the City of Irvine, the City of Tustin, and the City of Newport Beach would be affected (see Part II: Inundation Maps).

Directions to Rattlesnake Canyon Dam

In order to access Rattlesnake Canyon Dam from I-5, take the exit for Culver Drive and head northeast for roughly two miles. Turn right on Portola Parkway, and then left at Orange County Fire Station 55, just past Orchard Hills and the Irvine Ranch Conservancy. The dam access road is located at the end of that street. The street address that can be used to find the dam is 4955 Portola Parkway, Irvine, CA 92620.

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PART I: EAP INFORMATION

Section 1: Introduction

1.1 Background

Irvine Ranch Water District (IRWD) is an independent special district that serves 380,000 people in central Orange County, CA and owns and operates five jurisdictional dams, one of which is at the Rattlesnake Reservoir. Rattlesnake Canyon Dam is located in Irvine, CA. The spillway is located on the northwest corner of the reservoir, and is not considered a critical appurtenant structure by California's Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD). The reservoir collects natural runoff from a drainage area of 2 square miles and stores recycled water from IRWD's Michelson Water Recycling Plant (MWRP).

The dam at Rattlesnake Reservoir is an earthen dam originally constructed in 1959 by The Irvine Company. The California State Dam Number is 1029.003 and the National Dam Number is CA00855. The dam has a concrete spillway that discharges into an approximately 15-foot wide gunite-lined channel, and has a crest length of 120 feet. In addition to this spillway, Rattlesnake Canyon Dam has a steel outlet pipe which conveys water either into IRWD's recycled water distribution system or to a drain, depending on valve positions.

The dam is located in the San Diego Creek watershed in coastal hills about twelve miles inland from the Pacific Ocean. Topography upstream of the dam is hilly, with elevations ranging from about 415 feet to 1,430 feet. The area downstream of the dam is mostly flat and urban, draining gradually southwest to the ocean. Flooding from a dam failure at Rattlesnake Reservoir has the potential to inundate portions of the following communities:

- County of Orange
- City of Irvine
- City of Tustin
- City of Newport Beach

Figure 1-1 shows the location of Rattlesnake Canyon Dam and the above listed communities. Rattlesnake Canyon Dam impounds a reservoir along Rattlesnake Canyon Wash, which is tributary to Peters Canyon Wash¹. The drainage area upstream of the Rattlesnake Canyon Dam is 2 square miles. Peters Canyon Wash flows through the City of Irvine and a small portion of the City of Tustin to join San Diego Creek. San Diego Creek in that area is highly channelized. It flows southwest through the City of Irvine and the City of Newport Beach, where it flows into upper Newport Bay. The total drainage area of Newport Bay is about 150 square miles. San Diego Creek, at its point of discharge to Newport Bay, drains about 120 square miles. Newport Bay is a large estuary and harbor which is influenced by ocean tides.

Rattlesnake Canyon Dam, DSOD No. 1029.003, Orange County, California

¹ Peters Canyon Wash is sometimes also referred to as Peters Canyon Channel.




Figure 1-1 Rattlesnake Canyon Dam Area Overview



Figure 1-2 Rattlesnake Canyon Dam Vicinity Map

1.2 Purpose

A dam safety incident is an impending or actual sudden uncontrolled release or excessive controlled release of water from an impounding structure. The release may be caused by damage to or failure of the structure, flood conditions unrelated to failure, or any condition that may affect the safe operation of the dam. The release of water may or may not endanger human life, downstream property, or the operation of the structure. When people live in an area that could be affected by the operation or failure of a dam, there is the potential for an emergency related to a dam safety incident. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) defines an emergency as "any incident, whether natural or manmade, that requires responsive action to protect life or property."

The purpose of this Emergency Action Plan (EAP) is to detect actual or potential emergency situations associated with Rattlesnake Canyon Dam, facilitate notification of affected parties, assign roles and responsibilities to involved agencies, and take mitigating actions in time to minimize loss of human life or injury and property damage. These situations include, but are not limited to dam instability, sizable earthquakes, extreme storm events, major spillway releases, overtopping of the dam, outlet system failure, abnormal instrument readings, vandalism or sabotage, spillway or gate failures, and failure of the dam.

Emergency management authorities will use the information in this EAP to facilitate the implementation of their responsibilities. Local, county, and state authorities have coordinating plans in place to address local emergency operations and/or warnings and evacuations. Those plans are not reprinted in the EAP but are maintained by the responsible agencies.

DSOD has rated the Rattlesnake Canyon Dam as "Extremely High" based on the downstream hazard classification. Because of its hazard classification, IRWD developed this EAP in accordance with the requirements listed in California Water Code Sections 6160 and 6161 and Government Code Section 8589.5, following the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety: Emergency Action Planning for Dams (FEMA-64/July 2013).

1.3 Planning Team

The EAP was sent to the following affected agencies below for comment during an extended local agency review period.

- Irvine Ranch Water District
- City of Irvine Police Department
- Orange County Fire Authority²
- City of Tustin Police Department
- City of Newport Beach Police Department
- City of Newport Beach Fire Department
- Orange County Sheriff's Department, Emergency Management Division

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² OCFA provides fire service to both the City of Irvine and the City of Tustin

- Orange County Public Works
- Orange County Parks
- California Highway Patrol (CHP), Santa Ana Office
- California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) District 12 Office
- Downstream schools (Irvine Unified School District, Tustin Unified School District, Northwood Montessori)

The following agencies provided comments on the draft EAP or participated in consultations:

- Irvine Ranch Water District
- City of Irvine Police Department
- Orange County Fire Authority
- City of Tustin Police Department
- City of Newport Beach Police Department
- City of Newport Beach Fire Department
- Orange County Sheriff's Department, Emergency Management Division
- Caltrans District 12 Office
- Irvine Unified School District
- Tustin Unified School District

Outreach was completed for all jurisdictions potentially affected by a dam failure at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. The City of Irvine Police Department is the primary Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) for this EAP. Though the dam may affect multiple jurisdictions, the impacts are primarily within the City of Irvine. During the outreach process for this EAP, the City of Irvine Police Department and OCSD were consulted and agreed that Irvine Police Department should be the PSAP.

Staff from Irvine Police Department reviewed and approved the notification flowcharts presented in Section 3. The planning team for this EAP was similar to the planning team for Syphon Canyon Dam, which is a jurisdictional dam also owned by IRWD, located about 1.4 miles south-southeast of Rattlesnake Canyon Dam.

Emergency planning for the City of Irvine is coordinated through the Irvine Police Department³. The Emergency Management Administrator from the Irvine Police Department reviewed the EAP, approved the notification flowcharts presented in Section 3, and provided feedback on jurisdictional responsibilities. Orange County Fire Authority (OCFA) serves the City of Irvine as part of the OCFA Division 2 service area. The OCFA Division 2 chief reviewed the EAP and provided updated contact information for OCFA staff.

Emergency planning for the City of Tustin is coordinated through the Tustin Police Department³. A representative from the City of Tustin Police Department reviewed the EAP and provided updated phone numbers. OCFA also provides fire service to the City of Tustin as part of the

Rattlesnake Canyon Dam, DSOD No. 1029.003, Orange County, California

³ The City of Irvine, City of Tustin, and City of Newport Beach do not have offices of emergency services that are separate from their police departments.

OCFA Division 4 service area. The OCFA Division 4 chief was provided a copy of the EAP and was added as a plan holder, per discussion with the Division 2 chief.

The Newport Beach Police Department received a copy of the EAP and provided updated contact information. The Newport Beach Fire Department received a copy of the plan and did not have comments. Outreach was completed to DSOD to clarify responsibilities listed in this EAP. Additional coordination was conducted with the National Weather Service (NWS), CHP, Caltrans, and the Department of Water Resources (DWR) Flood Operations Center.

Three schools in close proximity to the dam were provided copies of the EAP and were added to the notification charts for a potential or imminent failure. The schools provided 24-hour contact phone numbers for administrators.

For more information, please contact the EAP Coordinator:

Emilyn Zuniga IRWD Safety and Security Manager

Section 2: Summary of EAP Responsibilities

2.1 Irvine Ranch Water District Responsibilities (Dam Owner)

IRWD, as the dam owner, is responsible for detecting and evaluating dam safety incidents, classifying the incident, notifying emergency management authorities, taking appropriate response actions, terminating the EAP, and follow-up tasks related to the dam incident.

General EAP responsibilities for IRWD are to:

- Detect, verify and assess emergency conditions
- Respond to emergencies at the dam site
- Activate and implement the Rattlesnake Canyon Dam EAP, including determining the appropriate emergency level
- Notify other participating emergency management agencies of emergency conditions, emergency level, EAP activation, and other critical information
- Take corrective action at the dam/reservoir
- Terminate the EAP
- Facilitate an after-action evaluation and report
- Update EAP on at least an annual basis
- Communicate with the public and the media

More detailed responsibilities, including duties by staff member, are given in Section 6.1 and *Table 6-1 Dam Owner Responsibilities by Role*.

2.2 Impacted Jurisdictions'/Public Safety Agencies' Responsibilities

A dam safety incident at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam has the potential to impact unincorporated areas of Orange County, the City of Irvine, the City of Tustin, and the City of Newport Beach. The involvement of potential impacted jurisdictions is crucial to the successful implementation of the EAP. Copies of the EAP were sent to impacted jurisdictions and public safety agencies as part of a local agency coordination effort to gather feedback and input to the emergency response process laid out in this EAP (see discussion in Section 1.3). Where applicable, comments from these agencies informed the responsibilities detailed below.

2.2.1 Field Level Incident Management

A dam safety incident is reported through a 911 or direct phone call to the Irvine Police Department (see Section 3). The emergency response through the public safety agencies can be assisted by the OCSD "Control One," which is the central point of contact for interoperable communications between all law enforcement, fire, and public works agencies responding to a dam safety emergency at the Rattlesnake Canyon Dam.

Once the incident is reported, an incident command post (ICP) may be established by the City of Irvine. The incident commander (IC) is a field level position that falls to the Irvine Police Department and/or the OCFA supervisor. For Potential Failure or Imminent Failure dam safety incidents, the City of Irvine Police Department and OCFA may establish a Unified Command to jointly perform the IC duties for a dam safety incident at the Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. The Unified Command, which would include IRWD, City of Irvine Police Department, OCFA, and possibly City of Tustin Police Department, may be required in order to share incident management responsibilities. Unified Command responsibilities consist of establishing the ICP, protecting life and property, controlling personnel and equipment resources, maintaining accountability for responder and public safety, and establishing and maintaining an effective liaison with outside agencies and organizations. The Unified Command/IC is responsible for all incident activities, including the development of strategies and tactics and the ordering and the release of resources. The Unified Command/IC has overall authority and responsibility for conducting incident operations, while IRWD is responsible for monitoring and remedial actions at the dam site (see Section 5). IRWD remedial actions will be controlled at the IRWD operations center. IRWD will coordinate with external emergency response agencies through the ICP, the City of Irvine EOC, and the County and OA EOC, if activated.

Unified Command/IC duties may include the following:

- Establishing command.
- Ensuring responder safety.
- Assessing incident priorities.
- Determining operational objectives.
- Developing an appropriate organizational structure.
- Maintaining a manageable span of control.
- Coordinating overall emergency activities.
- Coordinating the activities of outside agencies.
- Authorizing the release of information to the media.
- Terminating the emergency response⁴
- Participating in an annual review and update of the EAP.

2.2.2 City of Irvine (Irvine Police Department and OCFA)

Emergency planning for the City of Irvine is coordinated through the Irvine Police Department. In the event of a dam emergency at the Rattlesnake Canyon Dam, the City of Irvine Police Department will be the primary agency for executing and coordinating emergency response activities. As described in Section 2.2.1, depending on the nature of the incident and the designated emergency level, an ICP may be established. Additionally, depending on the severity of the emergency, a Local Emergency may be proclaimed, the City of Irvine EOC may be activated, and Orange County OA will be advised.

⁴ The Unified Command/IC has the authority to terminate the emergency response. IRWD, as the dam owner, will terminate the EAP.

As discussed in Section 2.1.1, a Unified Command may be established depending on the emergency. City of Irvine emergency response will be carried out by the Irvine Police Department and OCFA, at the direction of the Unified Command or IC.

Unified Command/IC responsibilities include:

- Advise threatened populations of the emergency, and apprising them of safety measures to be implemented
- Advise the Orange County OA of the emergency
- Identify the need for mutual aid and requesting such through the Orange County OA.
- Proclaim a Local Emergency by local authorities
- Implement public warning and notification
- Evacuation and rescue operations.
- Establish evacuation routes and road closures
- Medical care operations
- Care and shelter operations, including establishing shelters
- Facilitate return of evacuated individuals
- Access and perimeter control
- Public health operations
- Restoration of vital services and utilities
- Participate in an after-action evaluation

2.2.3 City of Tustin

The City of Tustin maintains responsibility for emergency preparedness and response within the city limits. Emergency planning for the City of Tustin is coordinated through the Tustin Police Department. The inundation area of a dam failure at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam includes areas of the City of Tustin (Map Panels 6, 7, and 8 of the maps in Part II of this EAP). Any emergency preparedness and response will be coordinated with the Unified Command/IC, as required.

The City of Tustin's emergency response will be carried out by the Tustin Police Department and OCFA, which provides fire service to the City of Tustin. Field level response will be coordinated with the Unified Command/IC. Tustin Police Department and OCFA responsibilities include:

- Advise threatened populations of the emergency, and apprising them of safety measures to be implemented
- Implement public warning and notification
- Evacuation and rescue operations
- Establish evacuation routes and road closures
- Medical care operations
- Care and shelter operations, including establishing shelters
- Facilitate of return of evacuated individuals
- Access and perimeter control
- Public health operations
- Restoration of vital services and utilities
- Participate in an after-action evaluation

2.2.4 City of Newport Beach

The City of Newport Beach maintains responsibility for emergency preparedness and response within the city limits. Emergency planning for the City of Newport Beach is coordinated through the Newport Beach Police Department. Since the inundation area of a dam failure at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam includes areas of the City of Newport Beach (Map Panels 12, 13, and 14 of the Main Dam Failure Maps in Part II of this EAP), any emergency preparedness and response will be coordinated with the Unified Command/IC. The inundation area for a sudden and total failure of the dam within the City limits is confined to the San Diego Creek channel, and no overtopping of major cross roads is predicted within the City of Newport Beach. Any field level response within the City of Newport Beach would be carried out by the Newport Beach Police Department and Newport Beach Fire Department. However, flooding is not likely within Newport Beach city limits.

The modeling that was conducted for the creation of the inundation map showed the impacts and risk of inundation are minimal once the flood wave reaches Newport Bay, west of Jamboree Road. Model results showed significant attenuation of the flood wave peak upon arrival in Newport Bay.

2.2.5 Orange County Sheriff's Department, Emergency Management Division

Thirty-four incorporated cities in the county are responsible for emergency planning within their jurisdictions. The County of Orange (County) is responsible for the emergency planning of 205 square miles of unincorporated area and all county-owned facilities and properties.

The County provides support to OA jurisdictions or local governments by identifying and coordinating resources and communicating with regional and state authorities. During disasters, OA jurisdictions are required to coordinate emergency operations with the OA and, in some instances, other local governments.

The County of Orange and Operational Area Emergency Operations Plan (County and OA EOP) provides guidance and procedures for the County to prepare for and respond to significant or catastrophic natural, technological or conflict-related incidents that produce situations requiring a coordinated response. It further provides guidance regarding management concepts, identifies organizational structures and relationships and describes responsibilities and functions of the emergency organization to protect life and property. OCSD EMD is responsible for developing, maintaining and distributing the County and OA EOP.

There are two organizations within the OA discussed in this EAP: County and OA EOC Manager and the Operational Area Coordinator (OAC).

<u>County and OA EOC Manager</u>. The OCSD EMD Director serves as the County and OA EOC Manager. The County and OA EOC Manager is the 24-hour point of contact for the County, Operational Area, State, Federal entities and agencies, and Mutual Aid Coordinators.

Responsibilities of the County and OA EOC Manager may include:

• Establish and maintain contact with the affected dam and reservoir owner or operators.

- Request current situational status of the affected dam and reservoir.
- Ensure the OAC, Board of Supervisors and Policy Group are notified and kept apprised of emergency conditions occurring due to a dam and reservoir failure event.
- Coordinate with the OAC to establish activation level of the County and OA EOC.
- Direct EMD staff to notify appropriate key personnel to report to the County and OA EOC, based on the activation level established.
- Establish and maintain communication with all impacted jurisdictions to ensure coordination of response activities and situational information.
- Ensure situational information is provided to OA jurisdictions, County departments and California Governor's Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES), and updated on a regular basis.
- Assist with the coordination of the County's reentry and recovery efforts.

Operational Area Coordinator. When an emergency impacts an OA jurisdiction, the Orange County Operational Area Agreement designates the OAC as being responsible for direction, coordination and communication of policy decisions, and coordinating resource needs and priorities between OA jurisdictions and the State throughout the emergency. In cases of dam and reservoir failure, the County and OA Emergency Operational Plan, Dam and Reservoir Failure Annex designates Orange County Public Works (OCPW) as the OAC.

Responsibilities of the OAC may include:

- Serve as a key decision maker in the County and OA EOC, providing direction and coordination necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Operational Area Agreement and responsibilities of the Operational Area Lead as specified in Title 19 California Code of Regulations Section 2409 (e).
- Coordinate with OA jurisdictions during emergency response.
- Maintain contact with the dam and reservoir owner/operator to receive regular updates on water releases and situation status.
- Represent the Operational Area in all dealings with the public or private agencies on matters pertaining to emergencies.
- Appoint a Public Information Manager (PIM) to coordinate dissemination of all emergency information.
- In coordination with the PIM, prepare and approve dam and reservoir failure information statement and instructions for the public to be released via: media, Emergency Alert Systems, NWS, and AlertOC.
- Activate the County and OA EOC to the appropriate level of organization and staffing to support operations.
- Participate in conference calls.
- Initiate discussion with the Policy Group on the necessity to proclaim a Local Emergency and/or Operational Area Proclamation of Emergency.

A dam and reservoir failure may require multi-jurisdiction, multi-agency and multi-discipline coordination at all levels, including first responders. The Dam and Reservoir Failure Annex delineates the specific organization and assignment of responsibilities within the County and OA EOC. The appropriate Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) and NIMS functions will be activated, based on the failure threat or situation.

Based on the inundation mapping conducted in support of this EAP, activation of the County and OA EOC is not anticipated. The City of Irvine is almost exclusively affected by a dam emergency at the Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. However, since no emergency response situation is completely predictable, there may be situations where the County and OA EOC may be activated and staffed based on the situation. Activation of the County and OA EOC is required by SEMS, Title 19 California Code of Regulations Section 2409 (f), under the following conditions:

- On Request A local government within the OA has activated its EOC and requested
 activation of the County and OA EOC to support its emergency operations.
 Jurisdiction(s) determine that additional response resources beyond that which would
 normally be covered by mutual aid are required and assistance from the OA may be
 necessary.
- Two City Local Emergency Two or more cities within the OA have proclaimed a Local Emergency.
- County and City Local Emergency The County and one or more cities have proclaimed a Local Emergency.
- Request for Governor's Proclamation A city, city and County, or County has requested a Governor's proclamation of a State of Emergency, as defined in Government Code 8558(b).
- State of Emergency A State of Emergency is proclaimed by the Governor of the State for the County or two or more cities within the OA.
- Request for Outside Resources The OA is requesting resources from outside its boundaries, except those resources used in normal day-to-day operations which are obtained through existing agreements providing for the exchange or furnishing of certain types of facilities and services on a reimbursable, exchange, or other basis as provided for under the Master Mutual Aid Agreement.
- Request for OA Resources The OA has received resource requests from outside its boundaries, except those resources used in normal day-to-day operations which are obtained through existing agreements providing for the exchange or furnishing of certain types of facilities and services on a reimbursable, exchange, or other basis as provided for under the Master Mutual Aid Agreement.

2.2.6 California Governor's Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) and Cal OES Warning Center

Cal OES plays dual roles in managing an emergency; one at the regional level and the other at the state level. The regions include Inland Region, Coastal Region, and Southern Region, while the state level constitutes the executives and brokers resources between the regions. The state level also interfaces with the National Response Framework, and informs the governor, legislature, and state emergency management stakeholders. Cal OES also implements state-level

media policy and provides the primary coordination with SEMS and NIMS at the federal level. Cal OES Southern Region will participate in the reviews of and updates to the EAP.

The Dam Safety Planning Division is responsible for reviewing and approving dam owners' EAP. This process includes division outreach and technical assistance to dam owners and local emergency management personnel. The Cal OES Dam Safety Planning Division may also provide guidance to local public safety agencies with regard to incorporating EAPs into their existing all-hazards key response and mitigation plans. The division will also participate in the annual review and update of the EAP.

The Cal OES Warning Center is the link for notifications between state and federal agencies for this EAP. At the request of the OA manager or a state agency, the Warning Center can obtain rapid responses from the personnel who coordinate resources for emergency response. The Warning Center is operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

2.2.7 California Department of Water Resources – Division of Safety of Dams

The mission of DSOD is to protect people against the loss of life and property due to dam failure. The California Water Code entrusts this regulatory power to DWR, which delegates the responsibility to DSOD. Section 6110 of the Water Code directs the Department to immediately employ any remedial means necessary to protect life and property if either: (a) the condition of the dam is so dangerous to the safety of life or property as to not permit time for the issuance and enforcement of an order relative to maintenance or operation, or (b) passing or imminent floods threaten the safety of any dam or reservoir. Section 6111 of the Water Code states that in applying the remedial means "the department may, in emergency, do any of the following: (a) lower the reservoir; (b) completely empty the reservoir; (c) take such other steps as may be essential to safeguard life and property." In the event of an emergency at the dam, DSOD actions could include, but are not limited to:

- Advising the dam owner's/operator's representative of remedial actions to take
- Ordering the dam owner's/operator's representative of remedial actions to take
- Assuming control of the dam if necessary to safeguard life and property
- Advising the dam owner's/operator's representative of the emergency level determination
- Inspecting the dam during and after the emergency
- Design review and approval of emergency repairs
- Acting as a dam technical specialist in the State Operations Center, or other emergency operations center

Additionally, per Water Code Sections 6160 and 6161, DSOD is responsible for the review and approval of inundation maps. The California Code of Regulations, Title 23, Division 2, Chapter 1, Article 6 defines the specific requirements of the inundation maps.

IRWD communicated with DSOD staff to confirm DSOD responsibilities as described in this EAP. These DSOD responsibilities were provided to IRWD by Richard Draeger, the regional engineer, via email on December 12, 2019.

2.2.8 National Weather Service Weather Forecast Office

The NWS has a congressional mandate to issue official public warnings for all weather-related events, including dam breaches and flooding. The NWS communicates all flash flood watches and warnings based on the inundation maps provided in this EAP. The San Diego Weather Forecast Office has a copy of the enclosed inundation map and will issue official public warnings upon notification, as appropriate. The NWS WFO will issue a 'Flash Flood Watch' for a potential dam failure and a 'Flash Flood Warning' following the confirmation of a dam failure for downstream areas.

2.2.9 DWR Flood Operations Center

The mission of the DWR Division of Flood Management is to prevent loss of life and reduce property damage caused by floods and to assist in recovery efforts following any natural disaster. The State-Federal Flood Operations Center, located in Sacramento, California, is operated by the Division of Flood Management. The Flood Operations Center provides a facility from which DWR can centrally coordinate emergency response state-wide. Upon activation of this EAP, the DWR Flood Operations Center will be notified by the dam owner. During a potential or imminent failure scenario, the DWR Flood Operations Center would be responsible for assisting with coordination among state and local agencies. The DWR Flood Operations Center can also provide technical assistance during an incident.

2.2.10 Orange County Public Works

A copy of the EAP was sent to Orange County Public Works (OCPW), as channel facilities and infrastructure managed by OCPW may be affected by an incident at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. OCPA is a plan holder of this EAP and may assist with response related to county-managed facilities.

2.2.11 Orange County Parks

A copy of the EAP was sent to Orange County Parks. Peters Canyon Trail, a county-managed trail, is located within the inundation area of Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. Orange County Parks dispatch is included on the notification charts for this EAP and would carry out warnings and evacuations for the county-managed trail. Orange County Parks response would be coordinated by the Unified Command/IC.

2.2.12 California Highway Patrol, Santa Ana Office

A copy of the EAP was sent to California Highway Patrol (CHP). Areas near Interstate 5 (I-5) and State Route 261⁵ would potentially be impacted by an incident at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. CHP dispatch is included in the notification charts in this EAP. In the event of an emergency at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam, CHP would be responsible for evacuating impacted highways and

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⁵ State route 261 is a toll road administered by the Transportation Corridor Agencies. However, Caltrans owns the toll roads and maintains them as part of the state highway system, and CHP is responsible for law enforcement on the toll roads. This EAP was provided to the Transportation Corridor Agencies for informational purposes.

controlling traffic on these roads. CHP response would be coordinated by the Unified Command/IC.

2.2.13 Caltrans

A copy of the EAP was sent to Caltrans staff at the District 12 (Orange County) office so that they could review the EAP with regard to state highway facilities. Emergency response at state highways would be coordinated by CHP through the Unified Command, but Caltrans staff may assist with response related to state-managed road facilities. Caltrans is included in the notification charts in this EAP.

2.2.14 Downstream Schools

Administrators from three schools in close proximity to Rattlesnake Canyon Dam were provided copies of this EAP and included on the notification charts. Schools include Hicks Canyon Elementary (Tustin Unified School District), Northwood Montessori School, and Canyon View Elementary (Irvine Unified School District). The schools are not assigned responsibilities in this EAP, but have been included in the notification charts to facilitate timely notifications.

Section 3: Notification Flowcharts

3.1 Notification Flowcharts

This section contains notification flowcharts and accompanying messages for each emergency level that could be activated at the Rattlesnake Canyon Dam: high flow, non-failure, potential failure, and imminent failure. The high flow and non-failure scenarios share a notification flow chart, as the same parties would be notified during each event, but have different notification messages. Similarly, the potential failure and imminent failure share a notification flow chart, but have different notification messages. The notification messages for all emergency levels can also be found in Appendix E of this EAP.

In the event of an emergency situation, IRWD and public safety agencies should reference theses flowcharts to know who to contact and in what order. Individuals or organizations at the beginning of flowchart branches are responsible for making all calls within that branch, in the order indicated. If a party is not answering the number indicated on the flowchart, the notifying party should reference the contact table given in Section 3.2 for alternate methods of contact. In order to facilitate clear and efficient communication of emergency conditions, suggested scripts for notification are included after each flowchart.

The Rattlesnake Canyon Dam has a small drainage area, and is filled and drained independently of a local stream. It is therefore highly unlikely that it would be affected by a high flow situation as described in the FEMA guidelines. However, a notification flowchart and emergency message have been included for the high flow scenario to ensure complete preparedness.

The potential failure and imminent failure notification flowcharts require that the PSAP, City of Irvine Police Department, make additional calls as part of the notification process. IRWD has coordinated with the City of Irvine Police Department to ensure that they have a copy of the EAP on hand and will utilize the notification flowcharts in Section 3.1. To ensure that notifications are made in a timely manner, multiple staff members will be available to make notification calls for the City of Irvine Police Department. The City of Irvine Police Department has agreed to perform the responsibilities in the notification flowcharts and in this EAP. These instructions will be updated annually when the plan is reviewed and contacts are updated (see Section 8.1).

High Flow and Non-Failure Notification Flowchart(a) Local 911 **Observer of Dam Incident** Dam Operator (b) IRWD Operations Standby 24-Hour: (949) 453-5300 **IRWD Recycled Water Primary Local Emergency Management** (c) (d) **Operations Supervisor** City of Irvine Police Department Bill Wesson **IRWD Operations Manager** Ken Pfister **Secondary Local Emergency Management** Orange County Fire Authority Dispatch (e) **IRWD Public Affairs** 0 **National Weather Service City of Irvine Police Department Emergency Management Administrator Robert Simmons IRWD Executive Director of Operations Tustin Police Department** Wendy Chambers Phone numbers and email addresses have been removed from this publicly posted copy of this Emergency Action Plan. That **Newport Beach Police Department** information is available from Irvine Ranch **DWR - Flood Operations Center** *Water District's district secretary:* Phone 949-453-5300 or Email **Newport Beach Fire Department** comments@irwd.com **State Emergency Management** (f) Cal OES Warning Center **California Highway Patrol Orange County Parks (WestComm) DWR DSOD Orange County "Control One" Caltrans District 12**

Notes


- a. Use this chart in concert with the Contact Log in Appendix D to document notifications.
- b. Inform the City of Irvine Police Department and IRWD Operations of the situation. Make it clear that the dam is currently safe.
- c. Contact the Dam Operator first in the call sequence if 911 is notified by a non-utility observer.
- d. City of Irvine Police Department notification calls will be made by multiple staff members to facilitate timely notifications.
- e. Orange County Fire Authority provides fire service to Cities of Irvine and Tustin.
- f. Contact Cal OES if deemed necessary by Operations Manager. Use the Cal OES Warning Center Dam Incident Report in Appendix I. Copy to City of Irvine Police Dept.

High Flow Emergency Level Notification Script

This is [your name and position].
We have an emergency condition at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam, No. 1029.003, located in Irvine.
We have activated the Emergency Action Plan for this dam and are determining this to be a <u>High Flow</u> condition. The Rattlesnake Canyon Dam is not in danger of failing. Again, this is a <u>High Flow</u> condition and the Rattlesnake Canyon Dam is not in danger of failing.
At on, IRWD observed or verified that flows into the reservoir
are unusually high.
Current flow into the reservoir is cfs.
Current flow from the reservoir to Michelson Water Recycling Plant is cfs.
Current water surface elevation in the reservoir is ft.
The dam is not predicted to fail as a result of this condition. We will provide updates detailing any changes in flow or dam condition, and will notify you when the high flow situation is resolved.
I can be contacted at the following number:
If you cannot reach me, please call the following alternative number:

n-Failure Emergency Level
This is [your name and position].
We have an emergency condition at Rattlesnake Reservoir, Dam No. 1029.003, located in Irvine.
We have activated the Emergency Action Plan for this dam and are determining this to be a Non-Failure condition. Again, this is a Non-Failure condition.
At on, IRWD observed or verified that:
We are implementing predetermined actions to investigate and respond to this condition.
The dam is not predicted to fail as a result of this condition.
We will advise you when the situation is resolved or if the situation gets worse.
I can be contacted at the following number:
If you cannot reach me, please call the following alternative number:

Prepared February 5, 2021



Notes:

= call sequence

- a. Use this chart in concert with the Contact Log in Appendix D to document notifications.
- b. Contact the Dam Operator first in the call sequence if 911 is notified by a non-utility observer.
- c. City of Irvine Police Department notification calls will be made by multiple staff members to facilitate timely notifications.
- d. Orange County Fire Authority provides fire service to Cities of Irvine and Tustin.
- e. Use the Cal OES Warning Center Dam Incident Report in Appendix I. Copy to City of Irvine Police Department.

This is	[your name and position].
We have an emo Irvine.	ergency condition at Rattlesnake Reservoir, Dam No. 1029.003, located in
We have activat Potential Failu	red the Emergency Action Plan for this dam and are determining this to be a red condition.
At on	, IRWD observed or verified that:
We are impleme	
that could result Please prepare t Parkway, Culve Northwood Mor	o evacuate the low-lying portions of the Northwood neighborhood, Portola r Drive, and adjacent areas including Canyon View Elementary School, ntessori School, and Hicks Canyon Elementary School. In the event of a
that could result Please prepare t Parkway, Culve Northwood Mor failure, large are	in dam failure. o evacuate the low-lying portions of the Northwood neighborhood, Portola r Drive, and adjacent areas including Canyon View Elementary School,
that could result Please prepare t Parkway, Culve Northwood Mor failure, large are	o evacuate the low-lying portions of the Northwood neighborhood, Portola r Drive, and adjacent areas including Canyon View Elementary School, ntessori School, and Hicks Canyon Elementary School. In the event of a eas are expected to be inundated from Portola Parkway to I-5.
that could result Please prepare t Parkway, Culve Northwood Mor failure, large are The dam could	o evacuate the low-lying portions of the Northwood neighborhood, Portola r Drive, and adjacent areas including Canyon View Elementary School, intessori School, and Hicks Canyon Elementary School. In the event of a eas are expected to be inundated from Portola Parkway to I-5.
that could result Please prepare t Parkway, Culve Northwood Mor failure, large are The dam could Reference the ir We will advise	o evacuate the low-lying portions of the Northwood neighborhood, Portola r Drive, and adjacent areas including Canyon View Elementary School, intessori School, and Hicks Canyon Elementary School. In the event of a eas are expected to be inundated from Portola Parkway to I-5. potentially fail as early as nundation map in your copy of the Emergency Action Plan.

nminent Failure Emergency Level	
This is an emergency. This is [your name and position].	
Rattlesnake Reservoir, Dam No. 1029.003, located in Irvine, is failing.	
The downstream area must be evacuated immediately.	
Repeat, Rattlesnake Reservoir, Dam No. 1029.003, is failing; evacuate the low-ly portions of the Northwood neighborhood, Portola Parkway, Culver Drive, and ad areas including Canyon View Elementary School, Northwood Montessori School Hicks Canyon Elementary School. Portions of Portola Parkway, Irvine Boulevard Drive, and Irvine Boulevard should be closed due to potential inundation. I-5 bet Culver Drive and Jamboree Road may become inundated. We have activated the Emergency Action Plan for this dam and are determining to an <u>Imminent Failure</u> condition.	ljacent l, and d, Culver ween
At on, IRWD observed or verified that:	
We are implementing predetermined actions to investigate and respond to this co	ndition.
Reference the inundation map in your copy of the Emergency Action Plan.	
I can be contacted at the following number	
If you cannot reach me, please call the following alternative number:	

The next status report will be provided in approximately 30 minutes.

Public Message

The following pre-scripted message may be used for emergency management authorities to communicate the <u>Imminent Failure</u> of the dam with the public:

Attention: This is an emergency message from ______ [emergency management agency]. Listen carefully. Your life may depend on immediate action.

Rattlesnake Reservoir, Dam No. 1029.003, located in Irvine is failing. Repeat. Rattlesnake Reservoir, Dam No. 1029.003, located in Irvine is failing.

If you are in or near this area, proceed immediately to high ground. The low-lying portions of the Northwood neighborhood, Portola Parkway, Culver Drive, and adjacent areas including Canyon View Elementary School may be flooded. Portions of Portola Parkway, Irvine Boulevard, Culver Drive, Irvine Boulevard, and I-5 may be closed due to flooding.

If you are in or near this area, proceed immediately to high ground away from low lying areas.

Repeat message.

3.2 Contact Information Table

The contact table below lists all parties included in the notification flowcharts, along with other key stakeholders. If unable to contact a party using the method shown on the flowcharts, refer to this table to attempt to contact through a different pathway. All contacts included in the flow charts and contact tables are confirmed to be up-to-date as part of the annual EAP review process.

Organization	Name	Primary	Secondary	Email Address
	(Title)	Phone #	Phone #	
Cal OES	California State Warning Center			
Canyon View	Christine Miller			
Elementary School ^(a)	(Principal)			
CHP	24-Hour Dispatch/Immediate			
CHP	Sgt. Todd Kovaletz			
CHP	Lt. Aaron Knarr			
Caltrans (District 12)	24-hour Notification Number			
Caltrans (District 12)	Bala Nanjappa,			osted
	(D-12 Maintenance Engineering)			been removed from this publicly posted been removed from is available from Irvine tinformation is available from Irvine the information is available from Irvine
				n this pur from Irvi
DWR DSOD	Andrew Mangney			oved from wailable s.
	(Chief, Field Engineering Branch)			reen remon is a.
DWR DSOD	Richard Draeger		ies have	a informu
	(Southern Regional Engineer)		addresses The	. A.com
DWR DSOD	Ashley Moran	40	d email action Flagretar	nts@irWu.
	(Area 9 Engineer)	mbers ar	d email addresses have d email addresses. The Action Plan. Seency Action secretar Seency district secretar Strict's district secomme Strict's district secomme Strict's district secomme	.,,,,
Hicks Canyon	Deena Vela	phone run Eme	strict's Email	
Elementary School ^(a)	(Principal)	copy of Water 15	₃₋₅ 300°	
Irvine Police	Robert Simmons	Ranch 949-45		
Department	(Emergency Management Administrator)	Phone		
Irvine Police	Non-Emergency Dispatch			
Department				
IRWD	Paul Cook, P.E.			
	(General Manager)			
IRWD	Ken Pfister			

Organization Email Address Name **Primary** Secondary (Title) Phone # Phone # (Water Operations Manager) Wendy Chambers **IRWD** (Executive Director of Operations) IRWD Bill Wesson Phone of this Emerical Secretary:

Phone of this Emerical Secretary:

Phone of this Emerical Secretary:

Water District's 3.5300 or Email Commensus Secretary:

Water 949-453

Phone 949-453 (Recycled Water Operations Supervisor) **IRWD** Beth Beeman (Public Affairs) **IRWD Operations Standby** Irvine Unified Stephen Bayne (Director) School District Newport Beach Jon T. Lewis Police Department (Chief of Police) Newport Beach Katie Eing (Emergency Services Coordinator) Police Department Newport Beach Casey Parks **Utilities Department** (Water Production Supervisor) Newport Beach Fire Jeff Boyles (Fire Chief) Department Northwood Lisa Fukunaga Montessori School^(a) (Center Director) NWS National Weather Service **OCFA** Shane Sherwood (Division 2 Chief) **OCFA Baryic Hunter** (Division 4 Chief) **OCFA** Non-Emergency Dispatch **Orange County** Dispatch (WestComm) Parks **Orange County** Christopher Lorenzi Parks (Supervising Park Ranger) **Orange County Emergency Operations Center**

Organization	Name	Primary	Secondary	Email Address
	(Title)	Phone #	Phone #	
Sheriff's Department	"Control One"			
Orange County	Non-Emergency Dispatch			and copy of this
Sheriff's Department				moved from this publicly posted copy of this moved from this publicly posted copy of this ilable from Irvine Ranch Water District's district ilable from Irvine Ranch Water District's .com
Tustin Police	Stu Greenberg		have been re	moved from Irvine Ranch was
Department	(Chief of Police)	l are and ema	il addresses nation is avo	ilable J.
Tustin Police	Sarah Fetterling	Phone numbers Plan.	That my	.com
Department	(Sergeant, Community Resources Unit)	Emergency	. Email comments with	
Tustin Police	Non-Emergency Dispatch	Phone numbers Plan. Emergency Action Plan. secretary: Phone 949-453-5300 or		
Department				

Notes: (a) Canyon View Elementary School, Hicks Canyon Elementary School, and Northwood Montessori School are all located in close proximity to the dam, and have been added to the tables in order to facilitate timely notifications.

Section 4: Project Description

Rattlesnake Canyon Dam was constructed in 1959. DSOD has given the dam a hazard classification of "Extremely High". The dam impounds Rattlesnake Reservoir, which stores recycled water for use in the IRWD service area. The dam is a compacted earth fill embankment. It has a crest length of 980 feet. The barrier height is 73 feet, as measured from the maximum water surface at the spillway crest elevation of 414.4 feet⁶ to the estimated downstream toe at an elevation of 341.4 feet. The upstream face of the dam has slopes with 3:1 ratios, and the downstream face of the dam is sloped at a 2.5:1 ratio.

DSOD has not identified any CAS for Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. Figure 4-1 is a schematic of the reservoir, showing the dam, spillway, and outlet works. A location map, including downstream jurisdictions, was previously provided in Figure 1-1. There are no upstream or downstream jurisdictional dams which would impact, or be impacted by, an incident at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. Syphon Canyon Dam, also owned by IRWD, is located approximately 1.4 miles south-southeast of Rattlesnake Canyon Dam; however, Syphon Canyon Dam is not inside the inundation area of Rattlesnake Canyon Dam.



Figure 4-2 Schematic of Rattlesnake Canyon Dam

⁶ All elevations discussed in this plan are referenced to the in the North American Vertical Datum of 1988 (NAVD88).

The capacity of the reservoir behind Rattlesnake Canyon Dam, based on DSOD records, is 1,480 acre-feet, However, as-built drawings indicate that capacity at the spillway crest elevation of 414.4 feet may have been up to 1,730 acre-feet. The dam has an upstream toe elevation ranging from 355 to 357 feet. The modeling and inundation areas associated with failure at the Rattlesnake Canyon Dam were completed using the full 1,730 acre-feet indicated in the as-built conditions. Although some of the capacity may be taken up by accumulated sediment, DWR regulations require that any accumulated sediment be modeled as water. Figure 4.1 is the storage-capacity curve.

The drainage area upstream of Rattlesnake Canyon Dam is 2 square miles. The reservoir collects natural runoff during the rainy season from this area. It also stores recycled water from IRWD's MWRP, which is located about seven miles southwest of Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. Recycled water is conveyed from the MWRP directly to Rattlesnake Canyon Reservoir. The reservoir has a 24-inch outlet pipe, which has four upstream slide gates and two downstream valves. The outlet pipe conveys water either into the recycled water distribution system, or to a drain, depending on valve positions.

Rattlesnake Canyon Dam has a concrete spillway which discharges into a gunite-lined channel. The spillway has a crest elevation of 414.4 feet. The bottom of the spillway channel is about 15 feet wide. The spillway channel discharges into a stilling basin before transitioning into a vegetated channel. A spillway capacity curve is not available for Rattlesnake Canyon Dam, and creation of one was outside the scope of this plan. The capacity of the spillway channel is not known, but its capacity would be greatly exceed by a dam failure flood wave.

Downstream of Rattlesnake Canyon Dam, water from a dam failure would flow through streets, overland flow areas, storm drain structures, and into Rattlesnake Canyon Wash. A dam failure flood wave at this location is expected to greatly exceed the capacity of these structures and channels. Channel capacity of Rattlesnake Canyon Wash is estimated to be on the order of 700 cfs. Inundation modeling completed for the maps in Part II shows that the capacity of this wash would be greatly exceeded by a dam failure flood wave.

The dam failure flood wave would also inundate Peters Canyon Wash. OCPW has historically measured flows on Peters Canyon Wash. In the channel, flows are typically less than 10 cfs; however, daily discharge after storm events can be as high as 1,000 to 3,000 cfs. Inundation modeling completed for the maps in Part II of this plan shows that a dam failure flood wave could exceed the capacity of Peters Canyon Wash and flood the channel and surrounding areas (see Panel 2 and Panels 4 through 8 in Part II). No extremely high flow or emergency flow conditions are known to have occurred at Rattlesnake Reservoir.

The water level in the reservoir is controlled through input valves, and if a potential or developing dam safety incident requires the lowering of the reservoir level, this must be done in

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⁷ Estimated from USGS Streamstats, on Rattlesnake Canyon Wash at latitude 33.73151, longitude -117.75870; 100-year peak flood used as estimate of channel capacity; measured channel dimensions and capacity are not known. https://streamstats.usgs.gov/ss/

⁸ Daily discharge data from Orange County Public Works for Station PCW, Peters Canyon Wash at Barranca Parkway.

accordance with the standard operating procedures described in IRWD's emergency plan. All actions associated with controlling flow into or out of the reservoir must be coordinated with the IRWD's water operations staff or a representative designated by IRWD.

Discharge curves for the outlet pipe have not been prepared; however, the typical discharge flowrate through the 24-inch outlet pipe is 15 to 25 cfs. At these typical discharge rates, the estimated time to drain the full reservoir would be 30 to 60 days, and water would be sent to the MWRP.

No extreme high flow or emergency events have ever occurred at the Rattlesnake Canyon Dam which affected the surrounding community or downstream areas. If the dam were to fail, the low-lying portions of the Northwood neighborhood, Portola Parkway, Culver Drive, and adjacent areas including Canyon View Elementary School, Northwood Montessori School, and Hicks Canyon Elementary School could be inundated. Portions of I-5 between Jamboree Road/261 and Culver Drive could be impacted by an incident at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. Portions of Portola Parkway, Irvine Boulevard, Culver Drive, and Irvine Boulevard would potentially be closed due to potential inundation. Interstate 405 (I-405) would not be impacted by an incident at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam: at that location, the flood would be confined to San Diego Creek and would not overtop I-405.

There are no dams upstream or downstream of Rattlesnake Canyon Dam which would contribute to or be affected by an emergency event at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. Syphon Canyon Dam, a jurisdictional dam also owned by IRWD, is located about 1.2 miles south-southeast from Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. The two dams are on separate stream tributaries, and a failure at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam would not affect Syphon Canyon Dam.




Figure 4-2 Reservoir Storage Capacity Curve

Section 5: EAP Response Process

There are four steps that should be followed when an unusual or emergency incident is detected at the dam. These steps constitute the EAP Response Process. The steps are:

- Step 1: Incident detection, evaluation and emergency level determination
- Step 2: Notification and communication
- Step 3: Emergency actions
- Step 4: Termination and follow up

Early detection and evaluation of the condition(s) or triggering event(s) that initiate or require an emergency response action are crucial. Timely determination of an emergency level ensures that the appropriate response actions are taken based on the urgency of the situation. Procedures for early notification are provided in Section 3 that allow all entities involved with plan implementation to respond appropriately. Preventive or mitigating actions must be taken to attempt to address conditions at the dam. Eventually, a determination will need to be made concerning termination of the incident. After the incident is over, follow-up activities may be required. All of these steps make up the general EAP response process and are discussed in the following sections.

5.1 Step 1: Incident Detection, Evaluation, and Emergency Level Determination

Step 1 involves emergency detection, evaluation, and incident classification. Regular surveillance at the site is the normal method of detecting potential emergency situations. For conditions beyond the normal range of operations, contact DSOD for assistance with evaluation.

5.1.1 Monitoring, Detection, and Early Warning

This EAP establishes the procedures to be employed by IRWD personnel to ensure the safety of life and property at and downstream of Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. There is a dam keeper on site who is generally there on nights and weekends. The dam is unattended during business days, but the water level in the reservoir is remotely monitored and IRWD water operations staff conduct daily visual inspections of the dam and appurtenances. IRWD has a dam safety program which regularly monitors and inspects features of the dam to detect problems. This program includes:

- Monitoring of reservoir data in a SCADA system with alarms/alerts
- Visual inspection of the dam on a daily basis
- Measurement of seven survey monuments on an annual basis. Survey data are compared to historical data to assess trends and detect anomalies.
- Measurement of water at three observation wells on a monthly basis. Data are compared to historical data to assess trends and detect anomalies.
- Inspection of flow at eight subdrains on a monthly basis. Flow is monitored for change in clarity and increase in flow.

• Measurement of water levels at sixteen piezometers on a monthly basis. Measurements are compared to historical data to assess trends and detect anomalies.

- Annual surveillance reports by IRWD staff
- Annual inspections by DSOD

Section 7: Preparedness contains more details about how monitoring and detection instrumentation are used by IRWD for incident preparedness.

The Irvine Ranch Conservancy has facilities immediately downstream of the dam. Any anomalies that are not detected by IRWD operations and maintenance staff, may be observed and reported by members the general public at the Conservancy. There are also several homes situated near Rattlesnake Canyon Dam near New Point Road. These two areas – the Conversancy and nearby homes – are where members of the public would be able to observe the dam and report any anomalies.

5.1.2 Emergency Level Determination

After identification of a dam threatening condition, the dam operator or a qualified engineer will determine if there is sufficient time for additional investigation before declaring an emergency situation. Prior to activating the EAP, the IRWD Operations Manager will determine the emergency level.

There are four dam safety emergency level categories for the Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. The sections below describe how each emergency level applies to the dam, *Table 5-1 Emergency Level* is provided for different incidents that pose dam safety hazards.

High Flow - High Flows in System, No Threat to Dam

The High Flow emergency level indicates that flooding is occurring on the river system, but there is no apparent threat to the integrity of the dam. The High Flow emergency level is used by the dam owner to convey to outside agencies that downstream areas may be affected by the dam's release. Although the amount of flooding may be beyond the control of the dam owner, information on the timing and amount of release from the dam may be helpful to authorities in making decisions regarding warnings and evacuations.

The Rattlesnake Canyon Dam has a small drainage area and is filled and drained independently of the local. It is therefore highly unlikely that it would be affected by a high flow situation as described in the FEMA guidelines. However, the high flow scenario has been included in this EAP to ensure complete preparedness.

Non-Failure – Unusual, Slowly Developing Event

The Non-Failure emergency level is appropriate for an event at a dam that will not, by itself, lead to a failure, but requires investigation and notification of internal and/or external personnel. This classification indicates a situation is developing; however, the dam is not in danger of failing. In many cases, these unusual events are remedied with no further action required. In some cases,

flow over spillways could cause unexpected flooding downstream, but the dam is not endangered. In cases of spillway releases, downstream residents may need to be notified if flooding threatens life or property, but it should be made clear that the dam is safe. Examples of Non-Failure events are (1) new seepage or leakage on the downstream side of the dam, (2) presence of unauthorized personnel at the dam, and (3) malfunction of an inlet valve in the open position creating the potential for high flow downstream of the dam or excessive erosion in the vicinity of the outlet works.

Potential Failure - Potential Dam Failure, Rapidly Developing

This classification indicates that a situation is rapidly developing that could cause the dam to fail. A reasonable amount of time is available for analysis before deciding whether to evacuate residents. Emergency responders in affected areas will be alerted that an unsafe situation is developing. The Potential Failure emergency level indicates that conditions are developing at the dam that could lead to a dam failure. Examples of Potential Failure events are (1) rising reservoir levels that are approaching the top of the non-overflow section of the dam, (2) transverse cracking of an embankment, and (3) a verified bomb threat. Declaration of a Potential Failure should convey that time is available for analyses, decisions, and actions before the dam could fail. A failure may occur, but predetermined response actions may moderate or alleviate failure.

Imminent Failure – Dam Failure Appears Imminent or In-Progress

The Imminent Failure emergency level indicates that time has run out, and the dam has failed, is failing, or is about to fail. Imminent Failure typically involves a continuing and progressive loss of material from the dam. It is not usually possible to determine how long a complete breach of a dam will take. Therefore, once a decision is made that there is no time to prevent failure, the Imminent Failure warning must be issued. For purposes of evacuation, emergency management authorities may assume the worst-case condition that failure has already occurred.

Table 5-1- Emergency Level Determination

Spillway flowing with active erosion gullies Potential Failure Spillway flowing with active erosion and head cutting advancing rapidly toward reservoir Imminent Failure Reservoir level reaches higher than 414.4 feet NAVD88 and is increasing (i.e. water level is above spillway crest and is increasing). Water from the reservoir is flowing over the top of the dam Imminent Failure New seepage areas in or near dam Non-Failure New seepage areas with cloudy discharge or increasing flow rate Seepage with increasing and significant flow rate Imminent Failure Seepage with increasing and significant flow rate Potential Failure Seepage with increasing and significant flow rate Imminent Failure Rapidly enlarging sinkhole Imminent failure New cracks in embankment Repage Potential Failure Seepage Non-Failure Seepage Potential Failure Seepage Visual shallow slippage Non-Failure Visual shallow slippage Non-Failure Visual deep-seated movement/slippage of embankment Potential Failure Visual deep-seated movement/slippage of embankment slope Imminent Failure Sudden or rapidly proceeding slides of embankment slope Imminent Failure Earthquake resulting in visible damage to dam or appurtenances Potential Failure Earthquake resulting in visible damage to dam or appurtenances Potential Failure Imminent Failure Imminent Failure Imminent Failure Instruments Releases causing erosion around outlet works Non-Failure Instruments Releases causing erosion around outlet works Non-Failure Verified bomb threat that, if carried out, could result in damage Potential failure Imminent Failure	Table 5-1- Emergency Level Determination			
Spillway Spillway flowing with significant erosion and head cutting advancing rapidly toward reservoir	Event	Example Situation	Emergency Level	
Spillway Spillway flowing with significant crosion and head cutting advancing rapidly toward reservoir	Fresion of	_ , , ,	Potential Failure	
Increasing (i.e. water level is above spillway crest and is increasing).			Imminent Failure	
New seepage areas in or near dam Non-Failure		increasing (i.e. water level is above spillway crest and is	Potential failure	
New seepage areas with cloudy discharge or increasing flow rate Potential Failure				
Seepage with increasing and significant flow rate Imminent Failure				
Observation of new sinkhole in reservoir area or on embankment Rapidly enlarging sinkhole Imminent failure	Seepage	New seepage areas with cloudy discharge or increasing flow rate		
Embankment Rapidly enlarging sinkhole Imminent failure		Seepage with increasing and significant flow rate	Imminent Failure	
New cracks in embankment greater than 1/4-inch-wide without seepage Potential Failure	Sinkholes		Potential failure	
Cracks in the embankment with seepage Potential Failure		Rapidly enlarging sinkhole	Imminent failure	
Visual shallow slippage Non-Failure		_	Non-Failure	
Visual deep-seated movement/slippage of embankment Sudden or rapidly proceeding slides of embankment slope Measurable earthquake reported within 50 miles of the dam Earthquake resulting in visible damage to dam or appurtenances Earthquake resulting in uncontrolled release of water over dam or rapidly developing flow through cracks or rapidly developing erosion through increased seepage Fire Significant fire in the area that affects access to the dam Instruments Instruments Non-Failure Releases causing erosion around outlet works Non-Failure Uncontrolled releases through the outlet but the dam's structural integrity is still maintained Uncontrolled releases through the outlet with dam failure imminent Verified bomb threat that, if carried out, could result in damage to the dam Detonated bomb that has resulted in damage to the dam or appurtenances Imminent failure	Settlement	Cracks in the embankment with seepage	Potential Failure	
Visual deep-seated movement/stippage of embankment Potential Failure		Visual shallow slippage	Non-Failure	
Sudden or rapidly proceeding slides of embankment slope Imminent Failure		Visual deep-seated movement/slippage of embankment	Potential Failure	
Earthquake resulting in visible damage to dam or appurtenances Earthquake resulting in uncontrolled release of water over dam or rapidly developing flow through cracks or rapidly developing erosion through increased seepage Fire Significant fire in the area that affects access to the dam Non-Failure Instruments Instrumentation readings beyond predetermined values Non-Failure Releases causing erosion around outlet works Non-Failure Uncontrolled releases through the outlet but the dam's structural integrity is still maintained Uncontrolled releases through the outlet with dam failure imminent Verified bomb threat that, if carried out, could result in damage to the dam Detonated bomb that has resulted in damage to the dam or appurtenances Imminent failure	Movement	Sudden or rapidly proceeding slides of embankment slope	Imminent Failure	
Earthquake resulting in uncontrolled release of water over dam or rapidly developing flow through cracks or rapidly developing erosion through increased seepage Fire Significant fire in the area that affects access to the dam Non-Failure Instruments Instrumentation readings beyond predetermined values Non-Failure Releases causing erosion around outlet works Non-Failure Uncontrolled releases through the outlet but the dam's structural integrity is still maintained Uncontrolled releases through the outlet with dam failure imminent Verified bomb threat that, if carried out, could result in damage to the dam Detonated bomb that has resulted in damage to the dam or appurtenances Imminent failure		Measurable earthquake reported within 50 miles of the dam	Non-Failure	
or rapidly developing flow through cracks or rapidly developing erosion through increased seepage Fire Significant fire in the area that affects access to the dam Non-Failure Instruments Instrumentation readings beyond predetermined values Non-Failure Releases causing erosion around outlet works Non-Failure Uncontrolled releases through the outlet but the dam's structural integrity is still maintained Uncontrolled releases through the outlet with dam failure imminent Verified bomb threat that, if carried out, could result in damage to the dam Detonated bomb that has resulted in damage to the dam or appurtenances Imminent Failure Imminent Failure		Earthquake resulting in visible damage to dam or appurtenances	Potential Failure	
InstrumentsInstrumentation readings beyond predetermined valuesNon-FailureOutlet System FailureReleases causing erosion around outlet worksNon-FailureUncontrolled releases through the outlet but the dam's structural integrity is still maintainedPotential FailureUncontrolled releases through the outlet with dam failure imminentImminent FailureSecurity ThreatVerified bomb threat that, if carried out, could result in damage to the damPotential failureDetonated bomb that has resulted in damage to the dam or appurtenancesImminent failure	Earthquakes	or rapidly developing flow through cracks or rapidly developing	Imminent Failure	
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Uncontrolled releases through the outlet with dam failure imminent Verified bomb threat that, if carried out, could result in damage to the dam Detonated bomb that has resulted in damage to the dam or appurtenances Imminent Failure Potential failure Imminent failure	•		Potential Failure	
Security Threat Detonated bomb that has resulted in damage to the dam or appurtenances Imminent failure			Imminent Failure	
appurtenances Imminent failure	· ·		Potential failure	
D 4 11 1 1 1 4 6 6 7 7 64 1 X 64		_	Imminent failure	
Damage that could adversely impact the functioning of the dam Non-failure	Cabatass/	Damage that could adversely impact the functioning of the dam	Non-failure	
Vandalism Damage that has resulted in seepage flow Potential failure			Potential failure	
Damage that has resulted in uncontrolled water release Imminent failure	, andansin	Damage that has resulted in uncontrolled water release	Imminent failure	

5.2 Step 2: Notification and Communication

After the emergency level at the dam has been determined, notifications are made in accordance with the appropriate notification flowcharts in Section 3. The notification flowcharts were prepared to assist EAP response personnel during an emergency. Each chart identifies who is responsible for notifying representatives and/or emergency management officials; the prioritized order in which individuals are to be notified; and who is to be notified. A contact list for the flowchart contacts, as well as other affected parties is found in Section 3.2.

During a dam safety incident, the observer of the dam incident will call 911 and/or the dam operator. If local 911 (primary local emergency management) is called first, they will then notify the dam operator. If the dam operator is notified first, they will ensure that primary local emergency management is also aware of the situation. Once the appropriate emergency level has been determined, the flowchart corresponding to that level will be used to inform affected parties of the situation as it progresses. Parties at the start of each branch are responsible for making all calls within that branch, in the order indicated. Positive contact is required. If it is not possible to contact a particular party based on the information given in the flowchart, the notifying party should refer to the contact table provided in Section 3.2.

The notification flowcharts (Section 3.1) require that the primary local emergency management agency, City of Irvine Police Department, make additional calls as part of the notification process. To ensure that notifications are made in a timely manner, multiple staff members will be available to make notification calls for the City of Irvine Police Department. City of Irvine Police Department has agreed to perform the responsibilities in the notification flowcharts and in this EAP. These instructions will be updated annually when the plan is reviewed and contacts are updated (see Section 8.1).

When performing notification and communication activities, it is important that people speak in clear, non-technical terms to ensure that those being notified understand what is happening at the dam, what the current emergency level is, and which actions to take. To assist in this step, prescripted messages are available in Appendix E. Additionally, fill out the Cal OES Warning Center Dam Incident Report (Appendix I) and use it for initial notifications. Use the Contact Log (Appendix D) to track required notifications that are attempted or made. The contact information on each notification flowcharts must be updated annually by the dam owner's/operator's representative.

In the event of an emergency, IRWD will coordinate closely with emergency management authorities. All parties must understand that the formal declaration of public emergency by emergency management authorities can be a very difficult decision. During this step, IRWD will provide any information that will assist in that decision. An early decision and declaration are critical to maximizing available response time.

5.3 Step 3: Emergency Actions

After the initial notifications have been made, IRWD will act to save the dam and minimize impacts to life, property, and the environment. Depending on the nature of the incident, a unified command may be established by the Irvine Police Department and the OCFA, and an ICP may be established to coordinate emergency response and/or evacuations. During this step, there is a continuous process of taking actions, assessing the status of the situation, and keeping others informed through communication channels established during the initial notifications. Additional resources may be requested through the ICP, City of Irvine EOC, or County and OA EOC if requirements exceed the IRWD internal maintenance, construction, and contracting capabilities.

Table 5-2 Possible Remedial Actions provides the dam owner/operator with a set of actions to take for different events. The actions listed are not all inclusive of those that may need to be taken during an emergency. Use the Emergency Incident Log (Appendix F) to document the emergency event.

Table 5-2 - Possible Remedial Actions

Condition	Description of Condition	Action to be Taken
Large Spillway Release/High Water Level	Reservoir level reaches elevation 414.4 ft NAVD88 (spillway begins to discharge).	1. Cease filling operations unless overfilling and spillway discharge is planned. Close inlet valves.
		2. If inlet valves have malfunctioned and cannot be closed, contact maintenance crews for immediate repair. Determine if inlet flowrate exceeds the spillway discharge capacity. If not, monitor spillway for signs of excessive erosion, and determine whether a high flow condition may exist downstream. Make notifications as appropriate.
Seepage	Localized new seepage or boils observed along downstream face / toe of earthen embankment with muddy discharge and increasing but controllable discharge of water	1. Measure and record feature dimensions, approximate flow rate, and relative location to existing surface features. Take photos if camera is available. Document location on a site plan and in inspection report.
		2. Place a ring of sand bags with a weir at the top towards the natural drainage path to monitor flow rate. If boil becomes too large to sand bag, place a blanket filter over the area using non-woven filter fabric and pea gravel. Attempt to contain flow in such a manner (without performing any excavations) that flow rates can be measured. Stockpile gravel and sand fill for later use, if necessary.
		3. Inspect the dam and collect piezometer, water level and seepage flow data daily unless otherwise instructed by engineer. Record any changes of conditions. Carefully observe dam for signs of depressions, seepage, sinkholes, cracking or movement.
		4. Contact geotechnical engineer and provide all data collected.
		5. Maintain continuous monitoring of feature. Record measured flow rate and any changes of condition, including presence or absence of muddy discharge.

Condition	Description of Condition	Action to be Taken
Seepage (cont.)	Localized new seepage or boils (cont.)	6. Review information collected by field inspection and provide additional instructions / actions as required. Recommend remedial seepage and stability measures.
		7. Make notifications if condition worsens such that failure is imminent.
	Criminal action with significant damage to embankment or structures where significant repairs are required and the integrity of the facility is compromised – condition appears stable with time.	1. Contact law enforcement authorities and restrict all access (except emergency responders) to dam. Restrict traffic on dam crest to essential emergency operations only.
Sabotage and Miscellaneous Other Issues		2. Assess extent of damage and visually inspect entire dam for additional less obvious damage. Based on inspection results, confirm if extent of damage to various components of the dam warrants revised emergency level and additional notifications.
		3. Perform additional tasks as directed by the Engineering Supervisor or designee.
		4. Make notifications if conditions worsen.
Earthquakes	Report of an earthquake epicenter within 50 miles	Inspect dam and evaluate the damage sustained and the potential danger of failure. Check for seepage, cracks, displacements, and settlement. Inspect outlet works and spillways. Evaluate instrumentation.
Erosion of Spillway	Erosion or undermining of concrete spillway	Provide temporary protection at the point of erosion by placing sandbags, riprap materials, or plastic sheets weighted with sandbags. Consider pumps and siphons to help reduce the water level in the reservoir. When inflow subsides, lower the water level in the reservoir to a safe level; continue operating at a lower water level to minimize spillway flow.
Fire		Implement fire procedures (if applicable).

Condition	Description of Condition	Action to be Taken
Abnormal Instrumentation Reading	Piezometers, monuments, and seepage measurements are outside of established dam safety parameters.	Conduct daily inspections of the dam. Check and record reservoir elevation, rate at which reservoir is rising, weather conditions (past, current, forecasted), discharge conditions of creeks/rivers downstream, and new or changed conditions associated with this event. Evaluate accuracy of instrumentation.
Outlet System Failure	Failure of the outlet system piping at a point inside the dam foundation.	Implement temporary measures to protect the damaged structure, such as closing the inlet. Lower the water level in the reservoir to a safe elevation, possibly by using pumps or siphons. Consider the severity of flow through outlet, risk to the dam foundation/liner and increased flows in determining emergency level.
Embankment Deformation	Cracks: New longitudinal (along the embankment) or transverse (across the embankment) cracks more than 6 inches deep or more than 3 inches wide or increasing with time. New concave cracks on or near the embankment crest associated with slope movement.	1. Measure and record feature dimensions, approximate flow rate, and relative location to existing surface features. Take photos if camera is available. Document location on a site plan and in inspection report.
		2. Restrict traffic on dam crest to essential emergency operations only.
		3. Contact geotechnical engineer and provide all data collected.
		4. Place buttress fill (min 3 ft. high, 15 ft. wide) against base of slope immediately below surface feature and extending 20 ft. beyond visible feature limits (parallel to the embankment). Stock pile additional fill.
		5. Place sand bags as necessary around crack area to divert any storm water runoff from flowing into crack(s).
		6. Inspect the dam; collect piezometer and water level data twice daily unless otherwise instructed by engineer; and record any changes of condition. Carefully observe dam for signs of depressions, seepage, sinkholes, cracking or movement.
		7. Review information collected by field inspectors and provide additional instructions / actions as required. Consider survey monitoring.
		8. Make notifications if conditions worsen such that failure is imminent.

Condition	Description of Condition	Action to be Taken
		1. Measure and record feature dimensions, approximate flow rate, and relative location to existing surface features. Take photos if camera is available. Document location on a site plan and in inspection report.
		2. Restrict traffic on dam crest to essential emergency operations only.
		3. Contact geotechnical engineer and provide all data collected.
Embankment Deformation (cont.)	Slides / Erosion: Deep slide / erosion (greater than 2 feet deep) on the embankment that may also extend beyond the embankment toe but does not encroach onto the embankment crest and appears stable with time.	4. Re-establish embankment fill slope. Place 5 ft. high buttress fill against base of slope at the slide location that extends at least 15 ft. beyond the furthest downstream limits (perpendicular to the embankment) and extending 20 ft. beyond visible feature limits at either end (parallel to the embankment).
		5. Place sand bags as necessary around slide area to divert any storm water runoff from flowing into slide(s).
		6. Inspect the dam; collect piezometer and water level data daily unless otherwise instructed by engineer; and record any changes of condition. Carefully observe dam for signs of depressions, seepage, sinkholes, cracking or movement.
		7. Review information collected by field inspectors and provide additional instructions / actions as required. Consider survey monitoring.
		8. Make notifications if conditions worsen such that failure is imminent.
	Sinkholes: Small depression observed on the embankment or within 50 feet of the embankment toe that is less than 5 feet deep and 30 feet wide or which is increasing with time.	1. Lower reservoir elevation.
		2. Measure and record feature dimensions, approximate flow rate, and relative location to existing surface features. Take photos if camera is available. Document location on a site plan and in inspection report.
		3. Restrict traffic on dam crest to essential emergency operations only.
		4. Contact geotechnical engineer and provide all data collected.

Condition	Description of Condition	Action to be Taken
Embankment Deformation (cont.)	Sinkholes (cont.):	5. Backfill the depression with relatively clean earth fill (free of organic materials) generally even with surrounding grade and slightly mounded (6 to 12 inches higher) in the center in order to shed storm water away from the depression. Stock pile additional fill.
		6. Inspect the dam; collect piezometer and water level data daily unless otherwise instructed by engineer; and record any changes of condition. Carefully observe dam for signs of depressions, seepage, sinkholes, cracking or movement.
		7. Review information collected by field inspectors and provide additional instructions / actions as required. Consider remedial construction such as grouting.
		8. Make notifications if conditions worsen such that failure is imminent.

5.4 Step 4: Termination and Follow-up

Once conditions indicate that there is no longer an emergency at the dam site, EAP operations are terminated and follow-up actions are completed. Generally, IRWD or a designated safety expert will be responsible for notifying the Unified Command/IC that the condition of the dam has been stabilized.

The IRWD General Manager, in consultation with the IRWD operations and engineering staff members, dam safety experts, and response personnel, is responsible for determining when the dam safety situation has stabilized. The General Manager will terminate the EAP, which signifies that the dam incident has been resolved at the dam site.

The IRWD Operations Manager will follow the notification flowchart to alert all contacts of the EAP's termination. The Operations Manager will complete the Termination Log (Appendix G).

The IC is responsible for terminating the field level emergency response and relaying this decision to appropriate individuals and agencies. Prior to the termination of an Imminent Failure event that has not caused actual dam failure, DSOD will inspect the dam to determine whether any damage has occurred that could potentially result in loss of life, injury, or property damage.

Post incident, the EAP Coordinator will set up and facilitate a meeting to review the incident and EAP implementation activities. The dam personnel involved with the plan implementation, as well as the responding agencies should be present at the meeting. The following topics will be discussed and evaluated in an after-action review:

- Events or conditions leading up to, during, and following the incident
- Significant actions taken by each participant and improvements for future emergencies
- All strengths and deficiencies found in the incident management process, materials, equipment, staffing levels, and leadership
- Corrective actions identified and a planned course of action to implement recommendations

IRWD will prepare an after-action report (Appendix H), which analyzes what happened, why it happened, and how it can be prevented in the future from a dam safety and/or EAP perspective. The City of Irvine Police Department, OCFA, City of Tustin Police Department, City of Newport Beach Police Department, and the County and OA EOC Manager may prepare a separate after-action reports focused on localized emergency response and evacuation. Outside agencies will be invited to contribute to the after-action report, and findings of the report will be used to improve the EAP.

Section 6: General Responsibilities

6.1 Irvine Ranch Water District Responsibilities (Dam Owner)

Overall IRWD dam owner responsibilities include:

- Detect, verify and assess emergency conditions
- Respond to emergencies at the dam site
- Activate and implement the Rattlesnake Canyon Dam EAP, including determining the appropriate emergency level.
- Notify other participating emergency management agencies of emergency conditions, emergency level, EAP activation, and other critical information
- Take corrective action at the dam/reservoir
- Terminate the EAP
- Facilitate an after-action evaluation and report
- Update EAP on at least an annual basis
- Communicate with the public and the media

The above responsibilities are to be executed in coordination with emergency management authorities. Dam owner responsibilities by role are outlined in *Table 6-1 Summary of Dam Owner's Responsibilities*. Responsibilities are listed for key personnel including the Operations Manager, Dam Operator, Executive Director of Operations, General Manager, Public Affairs, and EAP Coordinator.

IRWD, as the dam owner and operator, is responsible for developing and maintaining the EAP. This includes updating the EAP on at least an annual basis, including updating contact information and notification charts in Section 3. The dam owner is responsible for regular monitoring and inspections of the dam and for responding to emergencies at the dam.

As the dam owner, IRWD will carry out notifications as outlined in Section 6.2, including to the primary local emergency management, state emergency management, and the NWS. Notification charts and procedures are given in Section 3. IRWD's Public Affairs office will communicate with the public and the media. If needed, IRWD will procure outside equipment and materials to aid with a dam incident or emergency.

Table 6-1 Dam Owner Responsibilities by Role

	Table 0-1 Dani Owner Responsibilities by Role
Role	Responsibilities
IRWD Operations Manager	 Detect incident from alarms / SCADA / visual inspections, or other monitoring data. As soon as an emergency event is observed or reported, immediately determine the emergency level as detailed in Section 5. Utilize the emergency notification flowcharts in Section 3 to notify the appropriate response personnel and record notifications in the contact log in Appendix D. If no one is onsite, determine emergency level and dispatch operator to the site Coordinate directly with the Unified Command/IC or first responders at the dam site. Coordinate directly with the ICP, City of Irvine EOC, or County and OA EOC, if established. Coordinate with Dam Operator on gate, valve operations and emergency procedures Dispatch construction and maintenance crews as necessary Procure outside equipment and materials as necessary Provide regular status reports to senior management Upon termination of EAP by General Manager, notify all entities on notification charts Upon termination of EAP by General Manager, fill out a Dam Emergency Termination Log (Appendix G) Participate in the creation of an After-Action Report (Appendix H) to be used in the EAP review process.
Dam Operator/ On-site Monitor	Detect/confirm incident at dam Implement gate and valve operations and other emergency procedures Assess need for construction and maintenance crews and/or outside equipment and materials Coordinate dam site security during incident
Executive Director of Operations	 Make calls on notification charts Initiate periodic status report conference calls with dam operator, Operations Manager, and Public Affairs. Provide regular status reports to ICP, City of Irvine EOC, or County and OA EOC, if established. Coordinate with Public Affairs office
General Manager	 Initiate periodic status report conference calls with dam operator, Operations Manager, and Public Affairs. Provide regular status reports to ICP, City of Irvine EOC, or County and OA EOC, if established. Notify government authorities when the dam condition has been stabilized. Terminate the EAP. Coordinate with Public Affairs office
Public Affairs	 Mobilize to Irvine EOC, or County and OA EOC, if established. Participate in periodic status report conference calls with dam operator, Operations Manager, and management Provide input to staff on emergency communications Represent IRWD to media
EAP Coordinator	Update EAP at least annually Distribute EAP copies/updates to other plan holders Recilitate the creation of an After-Action Report (Appendix H) (see Sections 6.5 for additional information)

6.2 Notification and Communication Responsibilities

IRWD, as the dam owner/operator will determine the appropriate emergency level in accordance with Section 5, and then notify the appropriate emergency management authorities in accordance with Section 3. The dam operator or IRWD operations center will maintain the contact log (Appendix D) to document notifications for the appropriate emergency level.

IRWD's Operations Manager will notify the NWS of an emergency at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. Flood warnings and watches will be issued by the San Diego Weather Forecast Office of the NWS (see notification charts in section 3.1).

IRWD's Executive Director will notify the State Emergency Operations Center and DSOD (see notification charts in section 3.1). IRWD's Public Affairs office will be responsible for communication with the media.

If time allows, onsite personnel may be able to seek internal advice and assistance. However, under an Imminent Failure condition, the responsibility and authority for notification is delegated to the dam operator or local official. Notification protocols are determined by the classification level of the incident and are pre-determined in the notification flowcharts found in Section 3.

A unified command may be established in order to coordinate between multiple jurisdictions and/or agencies, as required. IRWD is designated as the lead agency for notification and coordination with both the City of Irvine and the County to initiate required response actions including the appropriate notifications to impacted community members. Once notified of an incident at the dam, the City of Irvine EOC or County and OA EOC may be activated to serve as the center for response, warning, and evacuation activities.

Emergency management authorities with statutory obligations are responsible for warning and evacuation within the affected areas (see Part II Inundation Maps).

Emergency incident logs should be used to document incident related events and should be maintained at command centers and at the dam site or dam operations center. Appendix F contains an example emergency incident log.

6.3 Evacuation Responsibilities

Inundation maps developed by IRWD and approved by DSOD are included in Part II of this EAP and have been distributed to the emergency management authorities listed in the notification flowcharts in Section 3. The EAP distribution list may be found in Appendix C. The inundation maps inform the development and refinement of warning and evacuation plans, and are based on the worst-case scenario of a complete and sudden failure of the dam when it is filled to the spillway crest elevation during a "sunny day" failure, without additional storm flows in Peters Canyon Wash or San Diego Creek. Water levels in the Rattlesnake Reservoir fluctuate considerably throughout the year. Inundation maps are based on conservative breach parameters and a situation where the reservoir is storing the maximum capacity of water. Therefore, the inundation maps included in Part II of this EAP should be considered a worst-case scenario.

Emergency planners and response personnel should consider the specifics of each situation when making response decisions during a dam emergency.

The Unified Command/IC will facilitate coordination among agencies and disciplines for evacuations within the affected area.

The City of Irvine and City of Tustin maintain the evacuation plans within their respective city limits for a dam safety emergency at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. The City of Irvine Police Department would lead evacuations in the City of Irvine. Similarly, the City of Tustin Police Department would lead evacuations in the City of Tustin. Both police departments may request assistance with evacuations from OCFA, which provides fire services to both cities. Public safety agencies will implement emergency response plans as required and at the direction of the Unified Command/IC.

Because the flood wave for a failure of Rattlesnake Canyon Dam would be entirely confined to the San Diego Creek Channel by the time it reached the city limits of Newport Beach, it is not anticipated that Newport Beach would assume any evacuation responsibilities. If it were determined that evacuation within city limits were required, the Newport Beach Police Department and Fire Department would retain the overall responsibility to provide an effective emergency response in compliance with existing city evacuation plans and direction from the Unified Command/IC.

OCSD, which is not part of the Unified Command, may be called upon by the Unified Command to assist with evacuations, if necessary.

6.4 Monitoring, Security, Termination, and Follow-up Responsibilities

The dam operator or an appointed representative will be designated as the onsite monitor from the beginning of a dam safety incident until the emergency has been terminated. This person will provide status updates to the IRWD Operations Manager, who will provide regular status reports to senior management and local authorities.

During a dam safety incident, the IRWD onsite monitor will oversee security at the dam site. Access to the dam site will be strictly controlled by IRWD. Only those required to respond to the emergency or execute remedial actions will be granted access to the site.

Termination of a dam safety emergency is twofold. The IRWD General Manager, in consultation with IRWD operations and engineering staff members, dam safety experts, and response personnel, is responsible for determining when the dam safety situation has stabilized. The IRWD General Manager will officially terminate the EAP. The Unified Command/IC is responsible for termination of the emergency response activities, including termination of an evacuation.

The dam owner and emergency response authorities should coordinate closely while making decisions to terminate both the dam safety event and the response efforts. Upon termination of the EAP, IRWD's Operations Manager will notify all flowchart entities which were activated at

the start of the emergency incident, and complete an Emergency Termination Log (Appendix G) for submission to DSOD and the Cal OES Warning Center (if notified).

Recovery activities will continue on different levels for all involved in the dam safety incident after the emergency has been terminated. IRWD will coordinate a follow-up evaluation after any emergency and prepare an after-action report. All participants in the dam safety incident should be involved in the evaluation and should keep logs during the incident. An example emergency incident log is provided in Appendix F, although emergency response agencies may maintain alternate documentation methods according to their established internal procedures. IRWD's EAP Coordinator will prepare an after-action report (Appendix H), which analyzes what happened, why it happened, and how it can be prevented in the future from a dam safety and/or EAP perspective. OCFA, the City of Irvine EOC Manager and the County and OA EOC Manager may prepare a separate after-action report focused on the emergency response and evacuation.

6.5 EAP Coordinator Responsibilities

IRWD has designated the IRWD Safety Manager as the EAP Coordinator. The EAP coordinator is responsible for overall EAP related activities, including the following:

- Provide leadership to ensure the EAP is reviewed and updated annually.
- Coordinate annual EAP exercises (see Section 7.2.2 for exercise schedule).
- Summarize the annual EAP exercise for posting to the IRWD website.
- Prepare revisions to the EAP after annual exercise and review.
- Verify and update agency contact information.
- Distribute copies of the revised EAP to all parties who received copies of the original EAP.
- Establish training seminars for IRWD personnel and primary emergency management authorities.
- Coordinate emergency outreach programs with residents and businesses in close proximity to the reservoir.
- After a dam safety incident, hold a meeting to review the incident and EAP implementation activities.
- Facilitate the creation of an After Action Report (Appendix H) after a dam incident by gathering incident information from authorities.
- Utilize any After Action Reports during EAP review process.

The EAP Coordinator is the main point of contact for any questions or comments regarding this EAP. The current EAP Coordinator for IRWD is Emilyn Zuniga, who can be reached at:

Emilyn Zuniga, IRWD Safety Manager Irvine Ranch Water District 3512 Michelson Drive Irvine, CA 92612-1799

Section 7: Preparedness

7.1 Surveillance and Monitoring

The Rattlesnake Canyon Dam EAP establishes the procedures to be employed by IRWD personnel to ensure the safety of life and property at and downstream of Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. The Water Operations Manager is responsible for the day to day operation of the reservoir and the dam surveillance and monitoring program. Operations are supported by IRWD maintenance activities. IRWD maintains a surveillance and inspection program for the Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. Monitoring and surveillance data is reviewed by an independent consultant and annual reports are prepared and maintained on file with IRWD. Schematic drawings of the dam which show the surveillance and monitoring instrumentation are included as Figures 7.1 and 7.2.

7.1.1 SCADA

IRWD has a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system that allows staff to remotely monitor water levels and alarms at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. Operations staff remotely monitor conditions at the reservoir.

7.1.2 Survey Monuments

Rattlesnake Canyon Dam has seven survey monuments. Annual surveys are conducted and compared to historical data. A cumulative settlement plot is maintained that indicates any movement of the monuments over time. Lateral or vertical shifting of the monuments is indicative of a potential dam safety issue and requires further investigation. DSOD reviews the annual surveys.

7.1.3 Piezometers

A piezometer is a small-diameter well used mainly to measure water levels. There are currently a total of 16 open-well piezometers that are being monitored at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. The water levels in the piezometers are measured by IRWD personnel on a monthly basis. Water levels in the piezometers are compared to reservoir surface water elevations and evaluated against data collected over a 10-year historical period. Anomalies in the piezometer data may be an indication of adverse conditions in the dam embankment or abutments.

7.1.4 Observation Wells

There are three observation wells located near the dam. Water levels in the wells are compared to reservoir surface water elevations and evaluated against data collected over a 10-year historical period. Anomalies in the water level data may be an indication of adverse conditions in the dam embankment or abutments.




Figure 7.1 Dam Surveillance and Monitoring Locations




Figure 7.2 Dam Surveillance and Monitoring Profile

7.1.5 Subdrains

The flow from the eight subdrains, which discharge into a drain junction vault and then flow out through an underground pipe at the left downstream toe of the dam, are measured by District personnel on a monthly basis. The flows are observed for clarity to check for the presence of any suspended solids that might indicate a potential piping condition. Blockages in the subdrain piping may cause seepage areas to appear upstream of the vault. Increased flows or anomalies based on historical data are investigated.

7.1.6 Visual Surveillance and Monitoring

Visual inspections are conducted daily by the dam operator that consist of monitoring the water surface elevation, inspecting visible appurtenances, inspecting the access roadway and spillway for cracking, inspecting the downstream toe for seepage, and inspecting the slopes and crest parapet wall for any visible displacement. Any visible cracking, seepage, or signs of settlement or instability are reported and trigger further investigation of the piezometers and monuments or engineering analysis. All of the outlet gates and blow off valves are exercised at least annually to confirm operability. DSOD requires the outlet valves and blow-off valves be exercised once every three years in the presence of a DSOD representative.

Maintenance is conducted as required to remove excessive vegetation at or near the spillway or on the dam face and to control rodent activity on the dam face.

7.1.7 IRWD and DSOD Inspections

IRWD conducts semi-annual inspections. DSOD inspections are conducted annually. Visual inspections of the dam, spillway, outlet, and seepage are conducted, along with a review of monitoring and surveillance data. Annual inspections are documented and maintained on file at both IRWD and with DSOD.

7.2 Evaluation of Detection and Response Timing

Timely implementation of the EAP and coordination and communication with emergency management authorities are crucial elements in the effectiveness of the emergency response effort. Total EAP implementation time from the initiation of an actual incident to determination of an emergency situation and notification of appropriate entities involved with implementation is evaluated through annual exercises and training. The time from the initial detection of an incident through the determination of the emergency level and execution of the notifications to the appropriate entities should take no more than 20 minutes. The initial detection and notification time will be evaluated during IRWD's annual review and exercises (see Section 7.2.2), and may be updated in subsequent EAP revisions.

7.2.1 Training

All personnel involved in the EAP should be familiar with the elements of the plan, their responsibilities and duties outlined in the plan and, if applicable, the types and availability of equipment during an emergency. Personnel should be familiar with problem detection and evaluation, and appropriate remediation actions, as detailed in this EAP.

7.2.2 Annual Review and Exercises

IRWD will review and, if needed, update the EAP at least once annually leading up to the emergency action plan notification exercise described below. This review includes contacting all parties listed in this EAP to verify that contact names, phone numbers, addresses and other information is current. One of the most important tasks is to verify and update the contacts listed in the Emergency Notification Flowcharts in Section 3. Making updates to locally available resources along with the other information in the EAP is also important so that accurate information is readily available during an emergency.

In accordance with California Government Code Section 8589.5(c), at least once annually, IRWD will conduct an emergency action plan notification exercise with local public safety agencies, to the extent that a local public safety agency wishes to participate. This annual exercise is to ensure that emergency communications plans and processes are current and implemented effectively.

Exercises will follow the types of exercises defined in the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), beginning with simple exercises and advancing to more complex exercises. Sufficient time should be provided between each exercise to learn and improve from the experiences of the previous exercise. IRWD, as the dam owner/operator, will coordinate with the City of Irvine, OCFA and the OCSD EMD in order to exercise the EAP. Exercises promote prevention, preparedness, and response to incidents and emergencies. Exercises may also be extended to include recovery operations. Periodic exercises result in an improved EAP as lessons learned are incorporated into the updated EAP document. The frequency and level of exercise will be determined in coordination with the City of Irvine, OCFA, the OCSD EMD and other local emergency response organizations.

The following are recommended frequencies for the exercise types described in the HSEEP:

- Seminars with primary emergency management authorities as part of the annual emergency action plan notification exercise annually.
- Drills to test the notification flowcharts in Section 3 and emergency equipment/procedures (emergency action plan notification exercise) annually.
- Tabletop exercise every 3 to 4 years or before functional exercises.
- Functional exercise every 5 years.
- Full scale exercise as required to evaluate actual field movement and deployment. At least one functional exercise should be conducted before conducting a full-scale exercise.

Functional and full-scale exercises should be coordinated with other scheduled exercises, whenever possible, to share emergency management resources and reduce costs.

7.3 Access to the Site

Access to the Rattlesnake Canyon Dam can be coordinated with the dam operator at the numbers provided in the notification flowcharts in Section 3. Depending on the dam safety incident, IRWD may establish an operations center to coordinate dam safety response activities and provide information to other emergency response personnel.

The dam is located near the intersection of Portola Parkway and Orchard Hills in Irvine, CA 92620. The main access road is located at 4955 Portola Parkway, Irvine, CA 92620. All vehicle access points (via the Portola Parkway and Conservancy access roads) are gated and locked. Portions of the property are fenced, but not all. Figures 1-1 and 4-1 provide additional site information.

In the event of a failure, the main access point from Portola Parkway could be inundated. A secondary access point is located along New Point Road and is not within the inundation area. If Portola Parkway near the dam is inundated, access the dam from the north: from the intersection of Portola Parkway and Culver Drive, take Culver Drive northeast and follow for 1.5 miles. Turn left (east) onto New Point Road. Drive about 1,000 ft until reaching an access path on the south side of New Point Road (Latitude 33.730211, Longitude -117.742208).

7.4 Response During Periods of Darkness

IRWD maintains a 24-hour emergency response staff to respond to various utility outages and emergency maintenance requirements. Because of this emergency response staff and the presence of a dam keeper on site at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam, the response during darkness is expected to be the same as during the day time (20 minutes). Phone numbers in the notification charts are 24-hour contact numbers, so notification procedures during periods of darkness are the same as on weekdays..

Any dam safety incident that requires response actions during periods of darkness may require additional lighting such as portable floodlights. IRWD maintenance and construction personnel can have rental lighting moved to the site in order to respond during times of darkness. Rental lighting equipment is located within 25 miles of the dam and could be moved to the dam site within 2 hours. Additional lighting may also be required by the dam operator in order to perform visual surveillance of a potential or developing situation. Additional lighting options are also available through the IRWD purchasing and contracting department from locally available sources.

7.5 Response During Weekends and Holidays

The dam keeper is generally on site during weekends and holidays, and IRWD staff are available for recall during emergencies. For slowly developing situations, staff may be recalled and a 24-hour operations center may be established in order to have resources readily available should the

situation deteriorate. A rapidly developing situation occurring after hours or during weekends and holidays may require the recall of engineering, maintenance, or other response personnel, and response may be delayed during the recall and mobilization of the IRWD staff. During weekends and holidays, IRWD staff could be onsite to assess a rapidly-developing emergency within 60 minutes. This means that the daytime response time of 20 minutes could be extended by 60 minutes, for a weekend/holiday response time of about 90 minutes.

7.6 Response During Adverse Weather

Periods of adverse weather that have the ability to impact dam safety may require additional staff to be on-call or prepared to execute response actions. The Director of Water Operations, in collaboration with the dam operator will make staffing recommendations to IRWD leadership during times of predicted adverse weather. Response time to an emergency situation may be lengthened by 30 minutes during periods of adverse weather. If the primary access to the site along Portola Rd is affected by a dam failure or adverse weather, vehicle access is possible from the residential neighborhood road directly north of the dam (see Section 7.3 for access points and directions).

7.7 Alternative Sources of Power

At Rattlesnake Canyon Dam, the reservoir's outflow, strainers and compressors require power, but have a backup power source on-site. Other reservoir operations do not require power and may be operated manually. Additional generators may be brought to the site to power lighting if needed to evaluate the dam in periods of darkness. Generators are located at the MWRP at 3512 Michelson Drive, Irvine, California, 92612. Generators may be brought to the dam site within 45 minutes.

In the event of an electrical outage, cellular phones may be used for communications in lieu of a telephone land line or computer.

7.8 Emergency Supplies and Information

IRWD maintains emergency supplies and response equipment for many potential response actions. IRWD's supplies are centrally located at the MWRP, located about seven miles southwest of Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. See list of materials in Section 7.9. In the event that the IRWD internal response capabilities are exceeded, *Table 7-1 Locally Available Resources* is provided to aid in securing additional response materials and equipment. The suppliers listed in Table 7-1 are typically open from 7am-5pm Monday through Friday; outside these hours, a dispatcher is typically available to handle after-hours requests. Secondary phone numbers have been listed where available.

Table 7-1 Locally Available Resources

Heavy Equipment Service and Rental	Sand and Gravel Supply	Ready-Mix Concrete Supply	
	Primary		
Herc Rentals-Jennifer	PTI Sand and Gravel- Mike	National Ready Mix	
Mendez	Ellena	Concrete- Joe Palladino	
3040 E Miraloma Ave	14925 River Rd	16282 Construction Dr Ctr	
Anaheim, CA 92806	Corona, CA 92676	Irvine, CA 92606	
Secondary			
Herc Rentals—Josh Anfang	Saddleback Materials		
3040 E Miraloma Ave	6090 Etiwanda Ave		
Anaheim, CA 92806	Mira Loma, CA 91752		

7.9 Stockpiling Materials and Equipment

No equipment is stockpiled at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. Because IRWD owns several dams, as well as other water facilities, IRWD centralizes its emergency supplies stockpile at the MWRP at 3512 Michelson Drive, Irvine, California, 92612. The stockpile at MWRP is located about seven miles southwest of Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. Supplies and equipment stockpiled centrally at MWRP are ready for deployment for use anywhere within the District's boundary. Equipment and supplies stored at MWRP include generators; diesel fuel; construction equipment such as backhoes and excavators; vacuum trucks; compressors; tools; traffic control equipment; and excavation and backfill materials including sand, crushed rock and road base material. Equipment at MWRP can generally be moved to the dam site within 45 minutes. Equipment, materials, and supplies required that exceed the IRWD capabilities are locally accessible at the locations in *Table 7-1 Locally Available Resources*. Equipment obtained from third parties listed in Table 7-1 could be obtained within about 2 hours during regular business hours.

7.10 Coordination of Information

In the event of an emergency at Rattlenake Canyon Dam, IRWD will notify the NWS so that they can issue appropriate flood watches and warnings. Contact numbers and notification procedures for NWS are outlined in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. No extremely high flow, overflow, or emergency flow incidents are known to have occurred at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam.

The Rattlesnake Reservoir stores recycled water and natural flows collected from the surrounding watershed. If a potential or developing dam safety incident requires the lowering of the reservoir level, this must be done in accordance with the standard operating procedures maintained by the MWRP. All actions associated with controlling flow into or out of the reservoir must be coordinated with the dam operator or a representative designated by IRWD.

There are no dams upstream or downstream of Rattlesnake Canyon Dam which would contribute to or be affected by an emergency event at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam, so no coordination is required with other dams.

IRWD will work with emergency personnel to keep them up to date on any situation involving the Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. The Water Operations Manager may designate staff members to act as liaisons at the ICP, a Unified Command, or at various EOCs, as required.

7.11 Training and Exercise

IRWD operations and maintenance staff receive training to ensure that they are thoroughly familiar with the elements of the EAP and potential response actions. The operations, engineering staff, and appropriate MWRP personnel are trained in the incident management process, including detection, evaluation, notification, and appropriate response actions during all emergency level determinations. IRWD duty staff are trained in notification requirements for dam safety incidents to ensure that the appropriate recall actions are initiated after working hours.

In accordance with California Government Code Section 8589.5(c), at least once annually, IRWD will conduct an emergency action plan notification exercise with local public safety agencies, to the extent that a local public safety agency wishes to participate. This annual exercise is to ensure that emergency communications plans and processes are current and implemented effectively. All contact information in the notification charts will be updated and verified; next, a notification exercise will be conducted to simulate the phone calls required in the notification charts. The timing and procedures in the notification exercise will be noted, and the EAP will be updated based on feedback from the participants.

Because Rattlesnake Canyon Dam is categorized as an extremely high-risk dam, local emergency management authorities may develop evacuation and shelter-in-place training materials for people who would be affected by a dam failure in their jurisdiction. These requirements and materials will be determined and developed through the review and exercise process described in Section 7.2.

7.12 Alternative Systems of Communication

In the event of a dam safety emergency, the Unified Command/IC and emergency response personnel have access to various forms of alternative communication ranging from social media, radio broadcasts, wireless emergency alerts, and opt-in email and cellphone lists. IRWD maintains an operations communication architecture for internal communications.

At the dam site, the dam keeper has access to a cellular phone, land line telephone, and a computer connected to internet.

7.13 Public Awareness and Communication

IRWD will utilize already established communication protocols and channels to publish and promote established inter-agency emergency procedures within the affected area. In addition, information on the location of reservoir as well as related emergency procedures will be available on the IRWD website (https://www.irwd.com/).

In order to further prepare the public for a dam safety incident IRWD will implement the following measures:

- Educate customers about established IRWD emergency notification systems, which include the ability to text, call or email customers in the event of an emergency such as a dam safety incident.
- Promote the emergency preparedness section on the IRWD website and through various communications channels including the monthly customers billing insert and social media channels.
- Coordinate emergency outreach programs with residents and businesses in close proximity to the reservoir through cities, fire and police departments and the County of Orange.
- Post a map of the inundation area on the IRWD website so that members of the public may see if they live within possible impacted areas.
- Post a summary of the annual EAP exercise on the IRWD website each year.
- Update existing information on dam safety and emergency-preparedness on the IRWD website within one month of the approval of the EAP. After each annual review, updates will be made to the website as necessary.
- Complete outreach to customers through existing outreach channels within 4 months of completion of the EAP.

The timing and frequency of additional outreach measures will be evaluated and updated as part of the annual EAP review.

Section 8: Plan Maintenance

8.1 Plan Review

The EAP Coordinator, Emilyn Zuniga, will review and update the EAP at least once annually leading up to the emergency action plan notification exercise described below. This review includes calling all contact information listed to verify that contact names, phone numbers, addresses and other information is current. One of the most important tasks is to update the contacts listed in the Emergency Notification Flowcharts in Section 3. Making updates to locally available resources along with the other information in the EAP is also important so that accurate information is readily available during an emergency.

In accordance with California Government Code Section 8589.5(c), at least once annually, IRWD will conduct an emergency action plan notification exercise with local public safety agencies, to the extent that a local public safety agency wishes to participate. This annual exercise is to ensure that emergency communications plans and processes are current and implemented effectively.

In accordance with California Water Code section 6161(e), IRWD will update the EAP, including the inundation maps, no less frequently than every 10 years, and sooner under conditions that include: (1) a significant modification to the dam or a critical appurtenant structure and (2) a significant change to downstream development that involves people and property. The inundation maps for this EAP are dated November 7, 2018, and are set to expire November 7, 2028.

8.2 Distribution

A status report will be prepared annually that documents the plan review and any exercises that occurred. The EAP will be revised, as required, to incorporate updated information or lessons learned during exercises/event after action reports. Changes will be documented in the revision log in Appendix B, Record of EAP Revisions.

Electronic copies of the EAP Status Report (Appendix A) and revised EAP will be distributed to the EAP Plan Holders annually via email (Appendix C). The EAP Plan Holders include all parties on the notification flowcharts.

Emilyn Zuniga, IRWD Safety Manager Irvine Ranch Water District 3512 Michelson Drive Irvine, CA 92612-1799

PART II: Inundation Maps

DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES

1416 NINTH STREET, P.O. BOX 942836 SACRAMENTO, CA 94236-0001 (916) 653-5791

FEB 0 6 2019

Wine Ranger Post Office Box 57000 Irvine, California 92619-7000

Rattlesnake Canyon Dam, No. 1029-3 Orange County

Dear Mr. Cook:

We have reviewed the inundation map submitted for Rattlesnake Canyon Dam. We have determined that the dam has no critical appurtenant structures and the map listed below is in substantial compliance with the requirements of Title 23, Division 2, Chapter 1, Article 6 of the California Code of Regulations. Therefore, the following inundation map is approved:

1. Main Dam (sunny day failure scenario) map dated November 7, 2018

The approved map will be made publicly available as required by section 6161(c) of the California Water Code. An emergency action plan (EAP) based on the approved inundation map must now be submitted to the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) for their review and approval. Upon Cal OES approval, please submit to us an electronic copy of the approved EAP with a hard copy of a transmittal letter.

Based on our evaluation of the downstream hazard, we have revised the hazard classification of Rattlesnake Canyon Dam from "High" to "Extremely High". If the downstream hazard classification is updated in the future, we will notify you.

Pursuant to section 6161(e) of the CA Water Code, the EAP and inundation maps must be updated no less frequently than every 10 years, and sooner under conditions that include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) a significant modification to the dam or a critical appurtenant structure as determined by the department, or (2) a significant change to downstream development that involves people and property. Based on the requirement, the approved map will expire on November 7, 2028. Please submit the updated map at least six months prior to the expiration date for our review and approval.

If you have any questions or need additional information, you may contact Project Engineer Y-Nhi Enzler at ----- or Re-evaluation Engineering Branch Chief Ariya Balakrishnan at ------

Sincerely,

Sharon K. Tapia, Chief Division of Safety of Dams

cc: (See Attached List)


Mr. Cook FEB 0 6 2019 Page 2


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
Mr. José Lara, Chief Dam Safety Planning Division California Governor's Office of Emergency Services 3650 Schriever Avenue


Mather, California 95655


Main Dam Failure – Maximum Depth and Arrival Time






























RATTLESNAKE CANYON DAM MAIN DAM SUNNY DAY FAILURE FLOOD ARRIVAL TIME AND MAX DEPTH

STATE DAM NO. 1029.003 NATIONAL DAM NO. CA00855 ORANGE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

DAM OWNER IRVINE RANCH WATER DISTRICT


PO BOX 57000 IRVINE, CA 92619-7000 (949) 453-5300

MODEL SIMULATION DATE: 9/14/2018 MAP PREPARATION DATE: 11/7/2018




Legend Maximum Inundation Depth 2.1) River Mile 1 - 5 ft Arrival Time 5 - 10 ft

~~~~ Creek City Boundary Map Panel#



- 1. The information shown is approximate and should be used as a

The information shown is approximate and shou guideline for emergency preparation and response.
 The North American Vertical Datum of 1988 was used for inundation modeling and mapping.
 Grid lines show latitude and longitude at 30 arc-second spacing in the WGS84 horizontal datum.






#### **PANEL 12 of 14**


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






# Main Dam Failure – Maximum Velocity and Arrival Time
























### RATTLESNAKE CANYON DAM MAIN DAM SUNNY DAY FAILURE FLOOD ARRIVAL TIME AND MAX VELOCITY

STATE DAM NO. 1029.003 NATIONAL DAM NO. CA00855 ORANGE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

# DAM OWNER IRVINE RANCH WATER DISTRICT PO BOX 57000 IRVINE, CA 92619-7000 (949) 453-5300

MODEL SIMULATION DATE: 9/14/2018 MAP PREPARATION DATE: 11/7/2018






- 1. The information shown is approximate and should be used as a

at 30 arc-second spacing in the WGS84 horizontal datum.

Molly Palmer, Civil Engineer 71788
Expiration Date December 31, 20



#### **PANEL 10 of 14**

Scale 1:6,000










### RATTLESNAKE CANYON DAM MAIN DAM SUNNY DAY FAILURE FLOOD ARRIVAL TIME AND MAX VELOCITY

STATE DAM NO. 1029.003 NATIONAL DAM NO. CA00855 ORANGE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA





- 1. The information shown is approximate and should be used as a



#### **PANEL 13 of 14**

Scale 1:6,000



## **PART III: Appendices**

# Appendix A: EAP Status Report (for Non-FERC dams)

## EAP Status Report for Rattlesnake Canyon Dam, DSOD No. 1029.003

**Annual EAP Review Performed:** 

**Annual Update Sent to Plan Holders:** 

**Annual Notification Exercise:** 

Prepared by:

Mail this document, or something similar, to the Cal OES Emergency Action Planning Division:

Dam Safety Planning Chief Dam Emergency Action Planning Division 3650 Schriever Avenue Mather, CA 95655

OR to send it electronically to the Division at <a href="mailto:eap@caloes.ca.gov">eap@caloes.ca.gov</a>.

## Appendix B: Record of EAP Revisions

| Revision # | Date                | Sections Reviewed or Revisions Made                                                                                                                                                                   | By Whom |
|------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|
| 1          | June 4, 2019        | Local Agency Review Draft                                                                                                                                                                             | IRWD    |
| 2          | January 31,<br>2020 | Draft Submittal to CalOES                                                                                                                                                                             | IRWD    |
| 3          | June 8, 2020        | EAP edited in response to CalOES<br>Review Report #1 date April 1, 2020;<br>notification charts updated                                                                                               | IRWD    |
| 4          | October 21,<br>2020 | EAP edited in response to CalOES<br>Review Report #2 dated June 26, 2020;<br>notification charts and contact<br>information updated; Appendix C<br>updated; signature page removed (not<br>required). | IRWD    |
| 5          | February 5,<br>2021 | Document edited in response to CalOES<br>Review Report #3 dated October 25,<br>2020; notification charts updated;<br>updated Warning Center incident report<br>(Appendix I)                           | IRWD    |
|            |                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                       |         |
|            |                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                       |         |
|            |                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                       |         |
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|            |                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                       |         |
|            |                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                       |         |

## Appendix C: Record of Plan Holders

| Copy<br>Number | Organization                                                         | Person Receiving Copy                                                                                       |
|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1              | Irvine Ranch Water District                                          | Wendy Chambers, Executive Director of<br>Operations                                                         |
| 2              | Irvine Ranch Water District                                          | Ken Pfister, IRWD Operations Manager                                                                        |
| 3              | Irvine Ranch Water District                                          | Malcolm Cortez, P.E.,<br>Engineering Department                                                             |
| 4              | Irvine Ranch Water District                                          | Bill Wesson, Recycled Water<br>Operations Supervisor                                                        |
| 5              | Irvine Ranch Water District                                          | Emilyn Zuniga, IRWD EAP Coordinator                                                                         |
| 6              | Irvine Ranch Water District                                          | Beth Beeman, IRWD Public Affairs                                                                            |
| 7              | Orange County Sheriff's Department,<br>Emergency Management Division | Kevin McArthur, Senior Emergency<br>Management Program Coordinator                                          |
| 8              | Orange County Public Works                                           | Penny Lew, P.E.<br>Sr. Civil Engineer<br>OCPW Flood Programs/Floodplain<br>Management and Hydrology Section |
| 9              | Orange County Parks                                                  | Christopher Lorenzi,                                                                                        |
| 10             | Orange County Fire Authority                                         | Shane Sherwood, Division 2 Chief                                                                            |
| 11             | Orange County Fire Authority                                         | Baryic Hunter, Division 4 Chief                                                                             |
| 12             | Newport Beach Fire Department                                        | Jeff Boyles, Fire Chief                                                                                     |
| 13             | Irvine Police Department                                             | Robert Simmons, Emergency Management<br>Administrator                                                       |
| 14             | Tustin Police Department                                             | Sarah Fetterling, Sergeant, Community<br>Resources Unit                                                     |
| 15             | Newport Beach Police Department                                      | Jon T. Lewis, Chief                                                                                         |
| 16             | Cal OES                                                              | Dam Safety Planning Division                                                                                |

| 17 | DSOD                                                       | Sharon Tapia, Chief of DSOD                                                   |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 18 | DWR Flood Operations Center                                | State-Federal Flood Operations Center                                         |
| 19 | National Weather Service                                   | Alex Tardy, Warning Coordination<br>Meteorologist,<br>Skywarn Program Manager |
| 20 | California Highway Patrol, Santa Ana<br>Office             | Sgt. Todd Koveletz Lt. Aaron Knarr                                            |
| 21 | Caltrans District 12 Office                                | Bala Nanjappa                                                                 |
| 22 | Irvine Unified School District                             | Stephen Bayne, Director                                                       |
| 23 | Tustin Unified School District, Hicks<br>Canyon Elementary | Deena Vela, Principal                                                         |
| 24 | Northwood Montessori School                                | Lisa Fukanaga, Center Director                                                |

## Appendix D: Contact Log

After determining the emergency level, use the contact log to document notifications made in accordance with Section 3 of the EAP.

#### **CONTACT LOG**

| Dam Name: RATTLESN                                                      | JAKE CANYON DAM         |                | Date: |          |                     |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------|-------|----------|---------------------|
| <b>NID</b> #: CA00855                                                   | .003 <b>FERC #:</b> N/A |                |       |          |                     |
| DSOD Region: SOUTH                                                      |                         | County: ORANGE |       |          |                     |
| Emergency Level:                                                        | Incident/Exercise:      |                |       |          |                     |
| After determining the eme person making the contact each agency/entity. |                         |                |       |          |                     |
| Agency/Entity                                                           | Person Conta            | acted          | Cont  | act Time | <b>Contacted By</b> |
|                                                                         |                         |                |       |          |                     |
|                                                                         |                         |                |       |          |                     |
|                                                                         |                         |                |       |          |                     |
|                                                                         |                         |                |       |          |                     |
|                                                                         |                         |                |       |          |                     |
|                                                                         |                         |                |       |          |                     |
|                                                                         |                         |                |       |          |                     |
|                                                                         |                         |                |       |          |                     |
|                                                                         |                         |                |       |          |                     |
|                                                                         |                         |                |       |          |                     |

Prepared February 5, 2021 Emergency Action Plan

## Appendix E: Pre-Scripted Messages

**High Flow Emergency Level Notification Script** 

The following pre-scripted messages are for use during notifications at any Emergency Level applicable to Rattlesnake Canyon Dam.

| This is [your name and position].                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| We have an emergency condition at Rattlesnake Canyon Dam, No. 1029.003, located in Irvine.                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| We have activated the Emergency Action Plan for this dam and are determining this to be a <u>High Flow</u> condition. The Rattlesnake Canyon Dam is not in danger of failing. Again, this is a <u>High Flow</u> condition and the Rattlesnake Canyon Dam is not in danger of failing. |
| At on, IRWD observed or verified that flows into the reservoir                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| are unusually high.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Current flow into the reservoir is cfs.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| Current flow from the reservoir to Michelson Water Recycling Plant is cfs.                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| Current water surface elevation in the reservoir is ft.                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| The dam is not predicted to fail as a result of this condition. We will provide updates detailing any changes in flow or dam condition, and will notify you when the high flow situation is resolved.                                                                                 |
| I can be contacted at the following number:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| If you cannot reach me, please call the following alternative number:                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |

a

| a-Failure Emergency Level |                                                                                                                                   |  |  |  |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|
| This is                   | [your name and position].                                                                                                         |  |  |  |
| We have an eme<br>Irvine. | rgency condition at Rattlesnake Reservoir, Dam No. 1029.003, located in                                                           |  |  |  |
|                           | ed the Emergency Action Plan for this dam and are determining this to be andition. Again, this is a <b>Non-Failure</b> condition. |  |  |  |
| At on _                   | , IRWD observed or verified that:                                                                                                 |  |  |  |
|                           |                                                                                                                                   |  |  |  |
| We are impleme            | nting predetermined actions to investigate and respond to this condition.                                                         |  |  |  |
| The dam is not p          | redicted to fail as a result of this condition.                                                                                   |  |  |  |
| We will advise y          | ou when the situation is resolved or if the situation gets worse.                                                                 |  |  |  |
| I can be contacte         | d at the following number:                                                                                                        |  |  |  |
| If you cannot rea         | ch me, please call the following alternative number:                                                                              |  |  |  |
|                           |                                                                                                                                   |  |  |  |

| itial Failure Em                                                     | ergency Level                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| This is                                                              | [your name and position].                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| We have an emer<br>Irvine.                                           | ergency condition at Rattlesnake Reservoir, Dam No. 1029.003, located in                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| We have activate<br><b>Potential Failur</b>                          | ed the Emergency Action Plan for this dam and are determining this to be <u>re</u> condition.                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| At on _                                                              | , IRWD observed or verified that:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
|                                                                      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| We are implement<br>that could result                                | nting predetermined actions to respond to a rapidly developing situation in dam failure.                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| Parkway, Culver                                                      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| the event of a fai                                                   | evacuate the low-lying portions of the Northwood neighborhood, Portola Drive, and adjacent areas including Canyon View Elementary School. In Ilure, large areas are expected to be inundated from Portola Parkway to I-5                                                                                         |
|                                                                      | Drive, and adjacent areas including Canyon View Elementary School. In                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| The dam could p                                                      | Drive, and adjacent areas including Canyon View Elementary School. In flure, large areas are expected to be inundated from Portola Parkway to I-5                                                                                                                                                                |
| The dam could p                                                      | Drive, and adjacent areas including Canyon View Elementary School. In flure, large areas are expected to be inundated from Portola Parkway to I-stotentially fail as early as                                                                                                                                    |
| The dam could p<br>Reference the int<br>We will advise y             | The Drive, and adjacent areas including Canyon View Elementary School. In flure, large areas are expected to be inundated from Portola Parkway to I-stotentially fail as early as  undation map in your copy of the Emergency Action Plan.                                                                       |
| The dam could p Reference the int We will advise y I can be contacte | The Drive, and adjacent areas including Canyon View Elementary School. In flure, large areas are expected to be inundated from Portola Parkway to I-stotentially fail as early as  Soundation map in your copy of the Emergency Action Plan.  You when the situation is resolved or if the situation gets worse. |

| ni                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | nent Failure Emergency Level                                                                                                    |  |  |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|
| ,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | This is an emergency. This is [your name and position].                                                                         |  |  |
| ]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Rattlesnake Reservoir, Dam No. 1029.003, located in Irvine, is failing.                                                         |  |  |
| ,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | The downstream area must be evacuated immediately.                                                                              |  |  |
| Repeat, Rattlesnake Reservoir, Dam No. 1029.003, is failing; evacuate the low-lying portions of the Northwood neighborhood, Portola Parkway, Culver Drive, and adjacent areas including Canyon View Elementary School. Portions of Portola Parkway, Irvine Boulevard, Culver Drive, and Irvine Boulevard should be closed due to potential inundation. I-5 between Culver Drive and Jamboree Road may become inundated. |                                                                                                                                 |  |  |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                                                                                                                                 |  |  |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | We have activated the Emergency Action Plan for this dam and are determining this to be an <b>Imminent Failure</b> condition.   |  |  |
| ć                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | · ·                                                                                                                             |  |  |
| ć                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | an Imminent Failure condition.                                                                                                  |  |  |
| -                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | an Imminent Failure condition.                                                                                                  |  |  |
| -                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | At on, IRWD observed or verified that:                                                                                          |  |  |
| -                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | At on, IRWD observed or verified that:  We are implementing predetermined actions to investigate and respond to this condition. |  |  |

The following pre-scripted message may be used for emergency management authorities to communicate the Imminent Failure of the dam with the public:

Attention: This is an emergency message from \_\_\_\_\_\_ [emergency management agency]. Listen carefully. Your life may depend on immediate action.

Rattlesnake Reservoir, Dam No. 1029.003, located in Irvine is failing. Repeat. Rattlesnake Reservoir, Dam No. 1029.003, located in Irvine is failing.

If you are in or near this area, proceed immediately to high ground. The low-lying portions of the Northwood neighborhood, Portola Parkway, Culver Drive, and adjacent areas including Canyon View Elementary School may be flooded. Portions of Portola Parkway, Irvine Boulevard, Culver Drive, Irvine Boulevard, and I-5 may be closed due to flooding.

If you are in or near this area, proceed immediately to high ground away from low lying areas.

Repeat message.

## Appendix F: Emergency Incident Log

| Name:                                            |                    | Job Title:                  |                 |  |
|--------------------------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|--|
| Incident Start Date:                             |                    | Incident Start Time:        |                 |  |
| Incident Description:                            |                    |                             |                 |  |
| Initial Incident Level:                          |                    |                             |                 |  |
| Incident Detection:                              |                    |                             |                 |  |
| When did you detect or learn about the incident? |                    |                             |                 |  |
| How did you detect or learn about the incident?  |                    |                             |                 |  |
| LOG AL                                           | L NOTIFICATION AND | ACTIVITY IN THE TABLE BELO  | )W              |  |
| Date                                             | Time               | Action/Incident Progression | Action Taken By |  |
|                                                  |                    |                             |                 |  |
|                                                  |                    |                             |                 |  |
|                                                  |                    |                             |                 |  |
|                                                  |                    |                             |                 |  |
|                                                  |                    |                             |                 |  |
|                                                  |                    |                             |                 |  |
|                                                  |                    |                             |                 |  |
|                                                  |                    |                             |                 |  |
|                                                  |                    |                             |                 |  |
|                                                  |                    |                             |                 |  |
|                                                  |                    |                             |                 |  |
|                                                  |                    |                             |                 |  |
| -                                                |                    |                             |                 |  |
|                                                  |                    |                             |                 |  |
|                                                  |                    |                             |                 |  |

## Appendix G: Emergency Termination Log

| Dam Name: RATTLESNAKE CANYON                   | County: ORANGE                        |  |  |  |
|------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|--|--|
| Dam Location: IRVINE, CA                       | Stream/River: RATTLESNAKE CANYON WASH |  |  |  |
| Date/Time:                                     |                                       |  |  |  |
| Weather Conditions:                            |                                       |  |  |  |
| General Description of Emergency Situation:    |                                       |  |  |  |
| Area(s) of Dam Affected:                       |                                       |  |  |  |
| Extent of Damage to Dam and Possible Causes    | :                                     |  |  |  |
| Effect on Dam Operation:                       |                                       |  |  |  |
| Initial Reservoir Elevation/Time:              |                                       |  |  |  |
| Maximum Reservoir Elevation/Time:              |                                       |  |  |  |
| Final Reservoir Elevation/Time:                |                                       |  |  |  |
| Description of Area Flooded Downstream/Dam     | nage/Loss of Life:                    |  |  |  |
| Justification for Termination of Dam Safety En | nergency:                             |  |  |  |
| Other Data and Comments:                       |                                       |  |  |  |
| Report Prepared By (Printed Name and Signatu   | nre):                                 |  |  |  |
| Date:                                          |                                       |  |  |  |
|                                                |                                       |  |  |  |

## Appendix H: After Action Report

#### **Background**

#### **Event Details**

Type of Event:
Location:
Incident Period:
Brief Description of Event:

#### **Response Activities**

**Summary of Successes** 

**Summary of Recommended Improvements** 

**Organizations Contributing to this Report** 

# Appendix I: Cal OES Warning Center Dam Incident Report

### DAM INCIDENT - CALIFORNIA STATE WARNING CENTER

| EVENT<br>TYPE:                                                     | ODI                                         | RILL          | OAC                | ΓUA    | L EVENT                    |                                   |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------|--------------------|--------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| DATE:                                                              | TIME:                                       |               |                    |        |                            |                                   |
| CALLER INFORMATION                                                 |                                             |               |                    |        |                            |                                   |
| NAME/AGENCY: PHONE #:                                              |                                             |               |                    |        |                            |                                   |
|                                                                    |                                             |               | PH                 | ONE #: |                            |                                   |
|                                                                    | DAM INFORMATION                             |               |                    |        |                            |                                   |
| DAM NAME: Rattlesnake Canyon Dam  DSOD DAM #: 1029.003  FERC: none |                                             |               |                    |        | FERC: none                 |                                   |
| DSOD HAZARD CLAS                                                   | SIFICATI                                    | ON: EXTREM    | ELY HIGH           |        |                            | 1                                 |
|                                                                    |                                             |               | LOC                | ATI    | ON OF DAM                  |                                   |
| DSOD REGION:                                                       | O <sub>NO</sub>                             | RTHERN (      | O CENTRA           | L      | ⊗ <sub>SOUTHERN</sub>      |                                   |
| PHYSICAL ADDRESS:                                                  | 4955 Po                                     | ortola Parkwa | ay, Irvine,        | CA 9   | 2620                       |                                   |
| <b>LATITUDE:</b> 33.7282                                           |                                             |               |                    |        | <b>LONGITUDE:</b> -117.742 | 1                                 |
| COUNTY: ORANGE                                                     |                                             |               |                    |        | DOWNSTREAM JURISD<br>Beach | OICTIONS: Irvine, Tustin, Newport |
| NEAREST CITY OR PO                                                 | OPULATE                                     | ED AREA: City | of Irvine          |        |                            |                                   |
| NEAREST OR AFFECT                                                  | TED HIGH                                    | HWAY OR CR    | OSS ROAD           | S: Or  | chard Hills Drive and P    | ortola Parkway                    |
| RIVER OR CREEK TH                                                  | AT FLOV                                     | WS INTO RES   | ERVOIR: R          | attles | snake Canyon Wash          |                                   |
|                                                                    |                                             |               |                    | SITU   | UATION                     |                                   |
| ACTIVATION OF EAP                                                  | :                                           | O Yes         | O <sub>No</sub>    |        |                            |                                   |
| EMERGENCY LEVEL                                                    |                                             | O High Flow   | w O <sub>Non</sub> | -Failu | re O Potential Failure     | O Imminent Failure                |
| EMERGENCY TYPE:                                                    |                                             |               |                    |        |                            |                                   |
| ☐ Earthquake                                                       |                                             |               |                    | Sand E | Boils                      |                                   |
| ☐ Embankment Crackin                                               | g or Settlei                                | ment          | ☐ Security Threats |        |                            |                                   |
| ☐ Embankment Moveme                                                | ent                                         |               | □ Se               | eepag  | e, Springs, Piping         |                                   |
| ☐ Erosion of Spillway                                              |                                             |               |                    | Sinkho | les                        |                                   |
| ☐ Instrumentation Read                                             | ing (Abnor                                  | rmal)         |                    | Storm  | Event                      |                                   |
| ☐ Outlet System Failure                                            |                                             |               |                    |        |                            |                                   |
| □ Sabotage/Vandalism                                               |                                             |               |                    |        |                            |                                   |
| OTHER:                                                             |                                             |               |                    |        |                            |                                   |
| RESERVOIR<br>LEVEL:                                                | ☐ Full                                      |               | Partially Ful      |        | ☐ Empty                    |                                   |
|                                                                    | A                                           | Approximate % | Full (Acre-l       | Feet): |                            |                                   |
| WHEN/HOW EVENT V                                                   | VAS                                         |               |                    |        |                            |                                   |
|                                                                    | DETECTED:  OBSERVER IN POSITION: O Yes O No |               |                    |        |                            |                                   |
| ADDITIONAL DETAILS:                                                |                                             |               |                    |        |                            |                                   |

## Appendix J: Acronym List

| CAS            | critical appurtenant structure                           |
|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| Cal OES        |                                                          |
| Caltrans       |                                                          |
| cfs            | cubic feet per second                                    |
| CHP            |                                                          |
| DSOD           | Division of Safety of Dams                               |
| DWR            |                                                          |
| EAP            | Emergency Action Plan                                    |
| EMD Orange Cou | anty Sheriff's Department, Emergency Management Division |
| EOC            |                                                          |
| EOP            |                                                          |
| FEMA           | Federal Emergency Management Agency                      |
| HSEEP          |                                                          |
| I-5            |                                                          |
| I-405          |                                                          |
| IC             |                                                          |
| ICP            |                                                          |
| IRWD           |                                                          |
| MWRP           |                                                          |
| NAVD88         |                                                          |
| NIMS           |                                                          |
| NWS            |                                                          |
| OA             |                                                          |
| OAC            | Operational Area Coordinator                             |
| OCFA           | Orange County Fire Authority                             |
| OCPW           |                                                          |
| OCSD           |                                                          |

| PIM   | Public Information Manager               |
|-------|------------------------------------------|
| PSAP  | Public Safety Answering Point            |
| SCADA | supervisory control and data acquisition |
| SEMS  | Standardized Emergency Management System |